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The hazards literature has identified many factors as being influential in the decision making 
process during high risk, short-notice disasters.  Risk perception and previous disaster 
experience are commonly identified as two of the more influential factors in this complex 
process.  However, few studies adequately address the complex role(s) that these factors play 
in self-protective decision-making during successive high-risk events.  In particular, the role of 
previous disaster experience during subsequent events is still a matter of considerable 
discussion and inconsistent findings.   
 
This thesis examines two events that occurred in August, 2011 in Goderich, Ontario: an F-3 
tornado that struck the community on August 21
st
 and a tornado warning that was posted for 
the region three days later on August 24
th
.  This case study provided the opportunity to 
examine the roles of risk perception and previous disaster experience in the decision-making 
process during successive high-risk events.  Semi-structured interviews (n=35) and close-ended 
questionnaires (n=268) were conducted to learn about the ways that individuals obtained and 
understood risk information, and to explore whether and how such information guided 
protective behaviors during the two events.  The interviews were analyzed using thematic 
coding to identify response patterns, and the questionnaires were analyzed using IBM SPSS 
software.   
 
It was found that a sizable portion of the sample population took protective actions on August 
24
th
 in ways that were inconsistent with their actions on August 21
st
.  Also, a significant 
portion of respondents chose not to take any form of protective action on August 24
th
 despite 
having previously experienced the damaging tornado.  The findings of this research suggest 
that the significance of previous disaster experience in the decision-making process is highly 
variable and context-dependent.  A second significant research finding involves the impact of 
the tornado on the place attachments of Goderich residents.  It was found that the disaster had 
significant impacts, both positive and negative, on participants' sense of place.  These findings 







First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor and role model, Jean Andrey, for all of her 
support and encouragement over the last two years.  I would also like to thank Jean for letting 
me take a chance on the Goderich tornado (thus abandoning my previous research proposal, 
which we had spent six months developing).  It was my dream to study tornadoes in southern 
Ontario, and Jean helped to make that dream a reality.  Thank-you, Jean.  For everything.   
 
I would also like to thank my second advisor, Cathy Conrad, for all of her support over the last 
four years.  Cathy, were it not for our talk that afternoon in the spring of 2009, I would never 
have known that I could study the human dimensions of hazards.  You will never know the full 
extent of my gratitude for your all of your help and support. 
 
Thank-you also to the moderators of various Facebook groups for helping me to recruit 
participants for my study.  Specifically, I would like to thank the organizers of the "Goderich 
Ontario Tornado victims and support", the "Goderich Tornado Clean Up Hub", the "Goderich 
Trees Project" and the "SAVE DOWNTOWN GODERICH" Facebook pages.  I would also 
like to publically thank Francesca Dobbyn, Richard Stewart, Luke Elliott, and Jody Armstead 
for their encouragement and support.   
 
Special thanks goes out to the Goderich Public Library, whose staff generously donated their 
time and assistance to this project.  I would also like to thank my research assistant Mitchell 
Avis for helping to recruit participants for this study.  Thank-you also to Brian Mills, Derrick 
Hambly, Lindsay Matthews, and Brent Doberstein for your encouragement and support.  I 
would also like to thank the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction (ICLR) for its generous 
financial support of this project.   
 
Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Allen, and my family for their continued support 









“Adversity is like a strong wind. It tears away from us all but the things 
that cannot be torn, so that we see ourselves as we really are.” 
 












Author's declaration .................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................. ix 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. x 
 
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
             
1.1 The case study ............................................................................................................... 1 
 1.1.1 Justification of the disaster .................................................................................. 2 
1.2 Thesis format  ................................................................................................................ 3 
 
CHAPTER TWO – REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
             
2.1 Defining environmental hazards ................................................................................. 5 
 2.1.1 Changing perspectives on natural hazards .......................................................... 7 
2.2 Social dimensions of disasters ...................................................................................... 8 
2.2.1 Vulnerability and resilience ................................................................................ 8 
2.2.2 Mitigation and adaptation ................................................................................... 9 
2.2.3 Risk ................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.4 Risk perception paradigms ................................................................................ 12 
2.2.5 Common themes in risk perception .................................................................. 14 
2.3 Decision-making in high-risk situations ................................................................... 16 
 2.3.1 The role of risk perception in decision-making ................................................ 16 
 2.3.2 Multi-level influences on decision making in high-risk situations ................... 18 
2.4 Tornadoes .................................................................................................................... 22 
2.4.1 Physical characteristics and risk ....................................................................... 22 
2.4.2 Tornado forecasts and warnings ....................................................................... 24 
vii 
 
2.4.3 Sources of severe weather information  ............................................................ 25 
2.4.4 Social vulnerability and public response to tornadoes ...................................... 27 
 
CHAPTER THREE – STUDY CONTEXT AND METHODS 
             
3.1 Introduction to the research problem ....................................................................... 32 
3.1.1 Tornadoes in southern Ontario .......................................................................... 32 
3.1.2 Goderich, Ontario ............................................................................................. 36 
3.1.3 The August 21
st
 Goderich, Ontario tornado ...................................................... 37 
3.1.4 The August 24
th
 severe storm system ............................................................... 39 
3.2 Research procedure .................................................................................................... 40 
3.2.1 Previous research on perception of and response to natural hazards ................ 40 
3.3 Methods of data collection .......................................................................................... 40 
3.3.1 Interview script ................................................................................................. 40 
3.3.2 Interview Recruitment ...................................................................................... 43 
3.3.3 Pre-project Goderich community meeting ........................................................ 44 
3.3.4 Interview process .............................................................................................. 44 
3.3.5    Questionnaires ................................................................................................... 45 
3.3.6 Questionnaire recruitment ................................................................................. 45 
3.4 Data analysis ................................................................................................................ 46  
 
CHAPTER FOUR – INTERVIEW RESULTS 
             
4.1 Participant demographics .......................................................................................... 48 
4.2 Respondent profiles .................................................................................................... 49 
4.2.1 Profile 1:  Abigail .............................................................................................. 49 
4.2.2 Profile 2:  William ............................................................................................ 53 
4.2.3 Comparison of the two profiles ......................................................................... 57 
4.3 Thematic Analysis  ...................................................................................................... 59 
4.3.1 General weather knowledge .............................................................................. 59 
4.3.2 August 21
st





 storm system .................................................................................. 65 
4.3.4 Risk communication ......................................................................................... 67 
4.3.5 Long-term recovery .......................................................................................... 70 
4.3.6 Comparison of the interviews and questionnaires ............................................ 73 
 
CHAPTER FIVE – QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
             
5.1 General weather question ........................................................................................... 74 
5.2 August 21
st
, 2011 Goderich, Ontario tornado .......................................................... 76 
5.2.1 Protective action decision-making .................................................................... 77 
5.2.2 Post -tornado recovery ...................................................................................... 80 
5.3 August 24
th
, 2011 storm system ................................................................................. 82 
5.4 Long-term recovery period ........................................................................................ 84 
5.4.1 Positive impacts on sense of community .......................................................... 84 
5.4.2 Negative impacts on place attachments ............................................................ 85 
 
CHAPTER SIX – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
             
6.1 Influential factors in the decision-making process .................................................. 87 
6.2 The use and dissemination of risk and recovery information ................................ 92 
6.3 Influence of the Goderich tornado on place attachments ....................................... 93 
6.4 Reflections on research method ................................................................................. 95 
6.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 96 
Appendix A: Interview script .................................................................................................... 98 
Appendix B: Questionnaire ..................................................................................................... 103 
References ............................................................................................................................... 118  
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2.1: Various definitions of disaster events ................................................................. 6 
Table 2.2: Summary of the evolution of the natural hazards paradigm ............................... 7 
Table 2.3:   Nine influential factors in the decision-making process ................................... 17 
Table 2.4:  The Fujita Scale and the Enhanced Fujita Scale ............................................... 24 
Table 5.1:   Demographic characteristics of the questionnaire respondents ........................ 75 
Table 5.2:   Demographic characteristics of the respondents who took  
  protective action during the August 21
st
 2011 tornado ..................................... 79 
 
Table 5.3:   Protective actions taken on August 21
st
 and August 24
th
 ................................. 83 





LIST OF FIGURES 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 3.1:  Confirmed and probable tornadoes in southern Ontario ................................... 33 
Figure 3.2: Comparison of tornado distribution and population density ............................. 34 
Figure 3.3:   Goderich, Ontario ............................................................................................. 36 
Figure 3.4: Radar reflectivity of the August 21
st
, 2011 storm ............................................. 38 
Figure 5.1:   Factors that motivated protective actions on August 21
st







INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
___________________________________________ 
 
1.1 The case study 
In the late afternoon of August 21
st
, 2011 an isolated supercell thunderstorm intensified over 
Lake Huron as it approached the eastern shore.  Environment Canada issued a tornado warning 
for this thunderstorm cell at 3:48 p.m., and approximately 12 minutes later the tornadic storm 
came ashore into the town of Goderich, Ontario.  Based on post-storm damage assessment 
surveys conducted by Environment Canada, the tornado was rated an F3 on the Fujita Scale of 
Tornado Intensity.  This made the Goderich tornado the most intense tornado to occur in 
southern Ontario since the Violet Hill tornado outbreak in 1996.  As a result of this storm, one 
individual was tragically killed and another 39 people were injured.  As of September, 2011 the 
Goderich, Ontario tornado has cost at least $75 million in insured damages.   
 
Three days later, on August 24
th
 2011, atmospheric conditions were once again primed for an 
outbreak of severe weather.  As a result of the antecedent conditions, Environment Canada 
issued a tornado watch early that morning for a large swatch across of southern Ontario, 
including the town of Goderich.  By late afternoon, Environment Canada upgraded the tornado 
watch to a tornado warning for the township of Goderich.  Although no tornadoes touched 
down in the Goderich area, three tornadoes were confirmed to have touched down in southern 




1.1.1 Justification of the disaster 
The August 21
st
, 2011 Goderich tornado and the subsequent severe storm system on August 
24
th
 provided the rare opportunity to examine the roles of risk perception and previous disaster 
experience during two successive high-risk events in the same community.  The Goderich, 
Ontario tornado also provided the unique opportunity to examine these influential factors from 
within the Canadian context.  The Canadian focus of this study has value in broadening the 
empirical literature on natural hazards, as the vast majority of the existing literature on risk 
perception and disasters was written from an American perspective. 
 
The overall objective of this research project was to identify the influential factors in the 
decision-making process during high-risk disasters.  Four research questions were developed to 
meet this objective: 
1. What influence do risk perception and previous disaster experience have on decision-
making during high-risk events?   
2. How do individuals obtain, interpret, and disseminate risk and recovery information 
before, during, and after disaster?   
3. How did the tornado influence sense of place and place attachments of Goderich 
residents immediately following the disaster, and into the long-term recovery period?   
4. Are the results of this research project consistent with existing studies on tornado 
perception and response that have been written from the American perspective?   
To answer these research questions, primary data was collected through two different methods.  
First, 35 in-person interviews were conducted with Goderich area residents between September 
and November, 2011.  These interviews were designed to gain an understanding of the 
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experiences, perspectives, and perceptions of those who were either directly or indirectly 
affected by the August 21
st
 tornado.  Second, questionnaires were distributed to a larger sample 
between December 2011 and March 2012 in order to determine the generalizability of the 
interview results. The questionnaire was also designed to probe respondents' experiences and 
perspectives on long-term recovery in the Goderich region.   
 
1.2 Thesis format 
Chapter two provides an overview of the current state of the environmental hazards literature.  
Although the hazards literature is extensive, the literature review emphasizes risk research as it 
pertains to information dissemination, perception, and response to hazardous events.  Chapter 
three outlines the Goderich, Ontario tornado case study and the subsequent August 24
th
 storm 
system that affected the region.  Chapter three also outlines the research methodology, and 
therefore includes both the interview and the questionnaire research frameworks.  Chapter four 
and five present the results from the interviews and the questionnaires, respectively.  Chapter 
four includes an in-depth analysis of two respondents profiles, as well as the results from 
thematic analysis of the interview transcripts.  Chapter five expands on insights gained from 
Chapter four.  Each results chapter provides insights on: general weather knowledge; the 
August 21
st
 tornado; the August 24
th
 storm system; the influence of the tornado on participants' 
place attachments; and the role of risk communication.  Particular emphasis was placed on the 
roles of risk perception and previous disaster experience on the decision-making process in 




Finally, Chapter six outlines the major research contributions of this project to the hazards 
literature.  These contributions include: findings on the role of risk perception and previous 
disaster experience on the decision-making process during successive high-risk disasters; the 
importance of word-of-mouth communication in the days following a damaging disaster; and 
the nuanced influence of disaster on sense of place attachments of Goderich residents.  These 
findings have important implications for emergency managers and decision-makers, 








REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
___________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Defining environmental hazards 
Throughout history, environmental hazards have posed a significant threat to human beings 
and their welfare.  Between 2000 and 2005, environmental disasters killed approximately 
80,000 people per year and directly affected another 300 million by destroying their homes, 
causing substantial economic losses, and resulting in serious health problems (Hyndman et al., 
2009).  Although the terms hazard and disaster are sometimes used interchangeably, they have 
distinct interpretations.  In the context of most geographical scholarship, an environmental 
hazard refers to "all the potential threats facing human society by events that originate in, and 
are transmitted through, the environment" (Smith and Petley, 2009: 9).  A hazard becomes a 
disaster when the affected group is incapable of recovering without external assistance 
(Hyndman et al., 2009).   
 
This definition of disaster is quite broad and would apply equally across a wide spectrum of 
events.  As such, various institutions have developed different classification systems in an 
attempt to distinguish between small- and large-scale disasters (Table 2.1).  The Worldwatch 
Institute highlights the difference between natural disasters and so-called 'unnatural disasters', 
defined as those events that have been made more frequent or severe due to human alteration 




Institution Event Classification Definition 
Worldwatch Institute Unnatural disaster Events made more frequent/severe due 
to human alteration of the environment. 
CRED Disaster ≥10 deaths or ≥100 affected 
Significant disaster ≥100 deaths or ≥1% population affected 
or ≥1% GDP lost. 
Munich Re Great natural catastrophe Events that overtax local communities, 
making interregional or international 
assistance necessary.   
 
 
Orleans, which was exacerbated by the destruction and development of wetland habitats, is a 
sobering example of an unnatural disaster.  The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain, Belgium distinguishes between disasters and 
significant disasters.  Based on their categorization, disasters are those events that result in 10 
or more fatalities or affect more than 100 people, whereas significant disasters are those events 
that result in 100 or more fatalities, or affect more than 1% of the total national population, or 
result in economic damages greater than 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (Smith and Petley, 
2009).   
 
Munich Re, a reinsurer that undertakes global data collection and trend analysis of natural 
disasters, differentiates between disasters and 'great natural catastrophes'.  Disasters are 
classified as great natural catastrophes only when "the ability of the region to help itself is 
distinctly overtaxed, making interregional or international assistance necessary" (Munich Re, 
2002: 15).  According to data collected by Munich Re, there has been a dramatic increase in 
the number of great natural catastrophes over the last fifty years.  In the 1950s there was an 
Table 2.1:  Various definitions for different scales of disaster events.   
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average of two such disasters per year, but that number had increased to approximately nine 
per year in the 1990s (McBean, 2004).  While the data show that economic losses from these 
catastrophes have risen exponentially since the 1960s, these losses are concentrated in the most 
developed countries whereas injuries and fatalities are concentrated in the least developed 
countries (O'Brien et al., 2006).   
 
2.1.1 Changing perspectives on natural hazards  
Human understanding of natural hazards is often conceptualized within the literature as having 
'evolved' from less sophisticated to more sophisticated over time.  Smith and Petley (2009) 
provide a comprehensive review of the five different stages of this evolution (summarized in 
Table 2.2).  However, this common conceptualization is lacking in several regards.  First, it 
presents scholarly understanding of hazards as having neatly progressed through a series of 
stages from 'less accurate' to 'more accurate'.  This reductionist approach fails to highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses of the different perspectives.  Second, this conceptualization fails to  
 
Period Paradigm name Main perspectives  
'Early times' Acts of God Disasters are external events that occur at the discretion 
of an omnipresent deity (Smith, 2010)  
Pre-1950 Engineering Humans can prevent or minimize disasters by building 
more efficient structures (McEntire, 2005) 
1950–70 Behavioral Hazards are not external to society.  Humans must 
adapt to or accommodate hazards, rather than relying 
solely on structural solutions (White, 1945) 
1970–90 Development Disasters in least developed countries occur due to 
marginalization, powerlessness, and impoverishment.    
1990– Complexity There exists a complex and reciprocal relationship 
between the environment and human society (Warner 
et al., 2002) 
 
 
Table 2.2:  A summary of the evolution of the natural hazards paradigm presented by Smith 




acknowledge that the development of each new 'paradigm' did not eliminate all prior belief 
systems.  At the time of writing, all five hazards paradigms are present to varying degrees 
across different social, political, and academic institutions.  For example, many tribal cultures 
continue to conceptualize natural hazards as 'acts of God', while many civil engineers believe 
the best way to reduce hazard risk is to design improved mitigation structures.   
 
It may be useful to discuss the 'evolution' of the scholarly understanding of hazards in terms of 
agency and complexity.  As human understanding of natural hazards expanded, the locus of 
control shifted from being entirely exogenous to human society (i.e., the belief that humans had 
no control over the frequency or severity of hazards) to increasingly endogenous.  As this shift 
occurred, researchers and practitioners came to appreciate the increasingly complex role of 
human agency in determining whether a hazard will become a disaster.  As a result of this shift, 
there has been an increasing emphasis placed on the research of societal dimensions of hazards, 
such as vulnerability and resilience.  The process of knowledge building was not strictly linear, 
nor was it neatly compartmentalized into discrete stages.  Instead, it has been (and continues to 
be) a process of defining and redefining scholarly understanding of hazards, with an increasing 
emphasis placed on human agency, and an increased appreciation of systems complexity.   
 
2.2 Social dimensions of disasters 
2.2.1 Vulnerability and resilience 
Within the natural hazards literature, vulnerability is often broadly defined as the potential for 
loss from a hazardous event (Cutter, 1996).  Smit and Wandel (2006: 286) provide a 
comprehensive definition of vulnerability as "reflective of (or a function of) the exposure and 
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sensitivity of a system to hazardous conditions, and the ability or capacity or resilience of the 
system to cope, adapt or recover from the effects of those conditions".  Sensitivity refers to the 
degree that a community could be affected by change, and exposure refers to the potential 
frequency at which change could occur.  Hence, vulnerability has both social and physical 
dimensions (Adger, 1999; Smit and Wandel, 2006).  Social vulnerability is influenced by many 
factors, including: societal demographics, infrastructure, political and social institutions, and 
perception of risk (Adger, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004).   
 
Within the last decade, there has been a notable increase in the amount of research that directly 
links social vulnerability with community resilience (e.g., Paton et al., 2001; Coles and Buckle, 
2004; Maguire and Hagan, 2007; Folke, 2006; Berkes, 2007).  In the context of disaster 
research, resilience refers to the ability of a community to absorb shocks and to revitalize itself 
if damaged (Tompkins and Adger, 2003).  Berkes and Jolly (2001) explain that resilience has 
three defining characteristics: (1) the amount of change a system can experience and still retain 
the same controls on function and structure, (2) the degree to which the system is capable of 
self-organization, and (3) the community's ability to build and increase its capacity for learning 
and adaptation.  Thus, resilience, adaptation, and vulnerability are all closely related concepts 
(Folke, 2006; Smit and Wandel, 2006).   
 
2.2.2 Mitigation and adaptation 
There are three broad potential responses to disaster risk: mitigation, adaptation, and inaction.  
Mitigation refers to any action taken to physically reduce the exposure of a community to a 
hazard.  Mitigation projects often take the form of engineered structures, such as levees and 
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dams.  Research has shown that investing $1 into the mitigation of disasters can save up to $7 
in recovery costs (Abramovitz, 2001).  For example, China invested over US$3 billion in flood 
control between 1960 and 2000, which is estimated to have prevented losses of about $US 12 
billion (UN/ISDR, 2008).  Mitigation efforts are most prevalent in developed countries with 
sufficient economic capital to support such projects.  
 
In comparison, adaptation refers to any action taken to reduce the sensitivity of a community to 
a hazard.  Smit et al. (2000: 225) provide a comprehensive definition of adaptation as the  
"adjustments in ecological-sociological-economic systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli, their effects or impacts".  Adaptation can therefore be proactive or reactive, 
and it can incorporate temporal, spatial, social, and physical connotations.  Adaptation policies 
often focus on improving education and communication, writing and enforcing zoning laws, 
and strengthening social networks.  A notable example of successful behavioral adaptation was 
discovered on Simeulue island, which is located 150 kilometers off the west coast of Sumatra, 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (McAdoo et al., 2006).  Residents of this low-lying island 
immediately sought higher ground after the earthquake occurred in December 2004.  Members 
of this community had access to traditional knowledge passed down through oral histories that 
warned residents to seek higher ground after an earthquake.  As a result of this adaptive 
behavior, only five individuals lost their lives to the disaster that would ultimately cause over 
230,000 fatalities (McAdoo et al., 2006).   
 
Not all adaptations are beneficial; some actions taken to reduce vulnerability to hazards may 
actually increase vulnerability or reduce resilience instead.  These maladaptive decisions 
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include "actions taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that 
impacts adversely on, or increases the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups" 
(Barnett and O'Neill, 2010: 211).  The Farakka Dam on the Ganges River near the border 
between India and Bangladesh is an apt example of this concept.  This Indian-build dam has 
profound negative consequences for downstream communities in Bangladesh by restricting 
water flow in the dry season and contributing to floods during the rainy reason.  
 
2.2.3 Risk 
There currently exists an ongoing debate within the risk research community about the most 
appropriate conceptualization of risk.  The two opposing factions can be identified as 
objectivists and subjectivists, and each party dominates a certain area of the risk literature.  
Within the technical literature, risk is most often conceptualized as an objective variable 
identified by the statistical or probabilistic expectation of an outcome (Hansson, 2010).  
Objectivists conduct risk assessments to identify and quantify 'real' risk (Slovic, 1987).  These 
risk assessments are most often completed by technical analysts to evaluate the potential for 
technological and environmental disasters.  In comparison, social scientists tend to 
conceptualize risk as a social construct that is interpreted within the context of a subjective 
reality (Hansson, 2010).  Subjectivists argue (often vehemently, e.g., Otway and Thomas, 
1982) that objective risk assessments are impossible since all decisions, from the initial 
framing of the problem statement to the final presentation of the results, are made within a 
subjective reality.  Slovic and Weber (2002) comment on this inherent subjectivity by 
describing the various ways that fatality risks associated with chemical accidents can be 
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conceptualized, measured, and expressed (e.g., deaths per million people in the population; 
deaths per facility; deaths per ton of air toxin released).   
 
In the current study, risk will be conceptualized in terms discussed by Hansson (2010: 236) 
who proposed a dual risk thesis: "an accurate and reasonably complete characterization of risk 
must refer both to the objective facts about the physical world and to (value) statements that do 
not refer to objective facts about the physical world".  Under this conceptualization, risk is 
understood to be both fact-laden and value-laden (i.e., it has both objective and subjective 
attributes) (Hansson, 2010).  In this research framework, objective risk can be understood as 
the statistical likelihood of a tornado occurrence in southern Ontario, whereas subjective risk 
refers to risk attitudes and risk perception of individuals in this region.   
 
2.2.4 Risk perception paradigms 
Risk perception research developed rapidly in response to public opposition to the 
development of chemical and nuclear technologies during the 1960s (Slovic, 1987; Sjöberg, 
2000).  Over time, three broad models were developed for assessing the complex opinions that 
people had about risk (Slovic, 1987): the psychometric model; the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework (SARF); and cultural theory.  These three models will be briefly discussed below; 
for an in-depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of model, refer to Sjöberg 
(2000). 
 
The psychometric model seeks to understand the cognitive faculties used to interpret and 
quantify risk.  Specifically, explanatory scales and multivariate analysis techniques are used to 
13 
 
quantify risk perception (Slovic, 1987).  Two factors in particular, dread risk and unknown 
risk, have been identified as either exaggerating or minimizing risk judgements, relative to 
expert analysis of 'real' risk (Gierlach et al., 2010).  Dread risk refers to the destructive 
potential of the anticipated hazard, while unknown risk refers to the individual's controllability 
and predictability of the event (Gierlach et al., 2010).  Proponents of the psychometric model 
assert that perceived risk is both quantifiable and predictable.   
 
The second model is the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), which studies the 
process through which risk is interpreted and meaning is attributed to an event (Gierlach et al., 
2010).  SARF asserts that risk perception can be heavily influenced by the social interpretation 
of a particular event (such as a tornado warning).  This constructed meaning is propagated 
across society via amplification stations (e.g., individuals, mass media, social networks) that 
repeatedly distort the perceived level of risk (Gierlach et al., 2010).  If the risk is interpreted by 
society to be less serious than analysts have determined, then this same process of propagating 
risk distortion is referred to as attenuation (Gierlach et al., 2010).  The degree to which 
perceived risk is amplified or dampened will in turn influence protective-action decisions by 
recipients of the distorted risk information. 
 
The third model that is prevalent in the risk perception literature is cultural theory.  Cultural 
theory asserts that social groups emphasize certain hazards based on the perceived relevance of 
that hazard to their social, political, and cultural values (Gierlach et al., 2010).  Thus, risk is 
always interpreted within the broader social context.  For example, schoolchildren in Japan 
may develop a distorted perception of tsunami risk after the 2011 March earthquake and 
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tsunami, but they may lack an appropriate conceptualization of tropical cyclone risk.  Although 
cultural theory has been criticized for its inability to accurately predict how individuals 
perceive risk, it is still widely utilized within the perceptions literature. 
 
Risk perception studies seek to understand the nature and extent of the discrepancy between 
the objective (actual) risk and the subjective (perceived) risk of a hazardous event.  Many 
social scientists are particularly interested in perceived risk, as risk perception is known to 
influence protective action decision-making.  As Slovic (1987: 281) explains:  
If successful, [risk perception] research should aid policy-makers by improving 
communication between them and the public, by directing educational efforts, and by 
predicting public responses to new technologies, events, and new risk management 
strategies. 
 
2.2.5 Common themes in risk perception   
Many factors, both internal and external, can influence risk perception, including: gender, 
ethnicity, age, socio-economic status, cultural values, social memory, and access to mass media 
(e.g., Gierlach et al., 2010; Paton et al., 2008; Sheridan, 2007; Sjöberg, 2000).  As such, there 
can be significant differences in the ways individuals perceive and respond to risk information.  
However, while risk perception is both a highly dynamic and personal construct, recent studies 
have found several consistencies in the way that many people interpret risk information.  The 
first tendency is for people to have an optimism bias, whereby individuals perceive themselves 
as being less at risk than other people (Paton et al., 2008; Gierlach et al., 2010).  This bias is 
found in numerous studies from different disciplines, including research on every day risks 
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(Sjöberg, 2000), weather warnings (Silver and Conrad, 2010), volcanic eruptions (Paton et al., 
2008), tropical cyclones (Hanson, 2003), and life choices (Weinstein, 1980).   
 
A second theme involves the difference between voluntary versus involuntary risks.  Through 
his research on acceptable risk-benefit trade-offs, Starr discovered that individuals are far more 
likely to accept voluntary risks than involuntary risks (Starr, 1969).  He found that individuals 
will accept risks from voluntary activities that are approximately 1000 times greater than they 
would accept from involuntary activities (Slovic, 1987).  For example, many individuals feel 
comfortable driving above the posted speed limit, but experience significant anxiety during air 
travel.  Building upon Starr's work, Slovic (1987) identified two variables that influence risk 
attitudes: dread risk and unknown risk.  Dread risk and unknown risk form the foundation of 
the psychometric model of risk perception discussed previously.  Dread risk is defined as the 
"perceived lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the 
inequitable distribution of risks and benefits" (Slovic, 1987: 283).  Risks that could result in 
awful outcomes, such as nuclear technology or air travel, are dread risks.  The second variable 
identified by Slovic (1987: 283) is unknown risk, defined as "hazards judged to be 
unobservable, unknown, new, and delayed in their manifestation of harm".  Stem cell research 
and certain medical technologies would rate high on the unknown risk scale.  Situations that 
rate very high on either the dread risk or the unknown risk scale (or both) are often perceived 
to be high-risk.   
 
A third common theme in risk perception research was established by the cultural theory of 
risk perception.  It was found that individuals who are deferential to authority are more likely 
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to support seemingly high-risk research, such as nuclear technology (Wildavsky and Dake, 
1990).  This finding is consistent with a political culture of hierarchy, and has been supported 
by recent research examining the differences in cultural risk perception between American 
citizens and Japanese citizens (Gierlach et al., 2010).   
 
The fourth theme relates to the exposure of individuals to mass media.  Some research suggests 
that an overabundance of risk information can contribute to a heightened perception of risk.  
For example, after the widely televised events of September 11
th
, 2001, people avoided flying 
by commercial airplanes out of an exaggerated fear of another terrorist attack (Gierlach et al., 
2010).  In contrast, other researchers have found no apparent relationship between the exposure 
to mass media and the distortion of risk perception (Sjöberg, 2000).  The relationship between 
these two variables is still a subject of considerable discussion (Sjöberg, 2000).    
 
2.3 Decision-making in high-risk situations  
2.3.1 The role of risk perception in decision-making 
There are numerous characteristics, both exogenous and endogenous, which could potentially 
affect individual decision-making, either directly or indirectly, in risky situations.  Prospect 
theory asserts that problem framing can control individual decision-making in high-risk 
situations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Prospect theory also purports that problem-related 
characteristics directly influence individual risk behaviour.  Sitkin and Pablo (1992) were 
particularly critical of prospect theory, which they charge as overlooking risk propensity as an 
influencing factor in decision-making.  In an effort to clarify the 'fragmented and 
oversimplified' model of prospect theory, Sitkin and Pablo (1992) identified nine key  
17 
 







- Risk preference Certain individuals enjoy the challenges associated 
with risk-taking more than others.   
Risk perception The subjective and often intuitive evaluation of risk 
by individuals. 
Risk propensity The innate tendency of an individual to be either 










Group composition Decisions made by a group can influence 
individual-level decision making.   
Cultural risk values Certain organizations prefer certainty over 
uncertainty and risk avoidance over risk-seeking. 
Leader risk orientation The risk preferences of a group leader can either 
encourage or discourage risk taking by group 
members.   
Organizational control systems If risk taking is rewarded or encouraged, 
individuals may be more prone to risky behavior 







Problem familiarity Previous experience with risk taking and 
familiarity with high-risk situations may cause risk 
seeking behavior that other, less experienced 
individuals would avoid.   
Problem framing The way that the situation is presented (i.e., either 
in terms of potential gains or potential losses, or as 
an opportunity or a problem) will influence either 
risk-taking will be sought or avoided. 
 
particularly critical of prospect theory, which they charge as overlooking risk propensity as an  
 
characteristics that influence decision-making in high-risk situations (Table 2.3).  These 
variables were organized into three broad categories: individual-, organizational-, and problem-
related characteristics.  Individual-level characteristics that affected decision-making included 
risk preferences, risk perception, and risk propensity.  Organizational-level characteristics 
included group composition, cultural risk values, leader risk orientation, and organizational 
Table 2.3:  Nine key characteristics identified and summarized by Sitkin and Pablo (1992) 
as being influential in the decision-making process during high-risk situations.   
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control systems.  Problem-related characteristics included problem familiarity and problem 
framing.  Of these factors, Sitkin and Pablo (1992) argued that risk propensity and risk 
perception are the two key characteristics that influence decision-making, particularly in high-
risk situations.   
 
Based on this research, Sitkin and Pablo (1992) developed the model of the determinants of 
risky decision-making behaviour, a theoretical framework for the study of decision making in 
high-risk situations.  This conceptual model highlighted the critical role of risk propensity and 
risk perception as mediators in the decision-making process.  In subsequent research, risk 
perception has been identified as the more influential of these mediating variables on 
individual decision making in risky situations (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995; Keil et al., 2000; 
Wong, 2005; Williams, 2007; Williams and Noyes 2007).  Although the reconceptualized 
model of the determinants of risk behavior proposed by Sitkin and Pablo (1992) and later 
updated by Sitkin and Weingart (1995) has been criticized for omitting influential variables 
(such as self-efficacy) and for its inability to conceptualize interactions between variables, it is 
still widely credited for highlighting the important role of risk propensity and risk perception in 
the decision-making process (e.g., Pennings and Grossman, 2008).     
 
2.3.2 Multi-level influences on decision making in high-risk situations 
As discussed previously, there are numerous individual-, family-, and community-level 
characteristics that may influence decision-making in high stress/high risk situations.  Much of 
the existing research in the hazards literature focuses on the influence of individual-level 
characteristics (e.g., gender, age, socioeconomic status, or risk propensity) on the decision 
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making process.  There has also been considerable research conducted to examine the 
influence of neighborhood- and community-level factors on individual behavior during crises.  
However, few studies in the hazards literature adequately explore the interconnected, multi-
level nature of the decision-making process (notable exceptions include: Burningham et al., 
2008; Norris et al., 2008; Paton et al., 2008; Pennings and Grossman, 2008). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that community- and institutional-level factors influence individual- 
and family-level decision-making in high-risk situations.  For instance, the presence or absence 
of tornado sirens and tornado shelters in a community can affect individual risk perception and 
protective actions taken during a tornado warning.  But can individual-level factors aggregate 
up to the community- or national-level?  In sudden onset disasters, most people make 
protective action decisions as individuals or as family groups, although individuals may seek 
risk confirmation from trusted friends or neighbors before taking action (Sherman-Morris, 
2010).  However, environmental disasters rarely affect only individuals; instead, disasters most 
often occur within a neighborhood- or community-level context (Norris et al., 2008).  In a 
study of flood disasters in Kentucky, Norris et al. (1994) documented community-wide adverse 
psychological effects that greatly affected the quality of life of residents and eroded their social 
networks.  Given that individual decision-making may be influenced (either directly or 
indirectly) by the broader social context, and the social context is, in turn, influenced by 
individuals, it is counter-productive to rigidly separate these factors when studying behavior in 




In their study on the role of risk attitudes and risk perceptions on decision-making, Pennings 
and Grossman (2008) argued that drivers of individual-level decision-making can aggregate to 
influence community-level response toward disaster.  The aggregation of all behaviors of all 
individual decision-makers within a community is referred to as behavioral outcome space 
(Pennings and Grossman, 2008).  The authors also asserted that behavioral outcome space must 
be effectively managed during a disaster by maintaining open communication, and by shaping 
risk attitudes and risk perceptions (Pennings and Grossman, 2008).  The tendency for 
individual-level behavior to aggregate to the community level is also supported by research on 
criminal violence (Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994), domestic violence (Koenig et al., 2003), and 
community resilience (Norris et al., 2008).   
 
The dynamic interplay between the various individual- and community-level factors that 
influence decision-making has important implications for community-level disaster risk 
reduction policies.  Consider public education campaigns, which are an example of the 
community-level influence on the individual decision-making process in high-risk situations 
(Paton et al., 2008).  Recent research has shown that top-down education campaigns, which 
identify knowledge gaps within the community and then attempt to eliminate these gaps by 
providing relevant risk information to individuals, are largely unsuccessful (Burningham et al., 
2008).  Ironically, these education campaigns may actually increase social vulnerability 
through a process called risk compensation (Paton et al., 2008).  Risk compensation occurs 
because "individuals maintain a balance between perceived level of safety proffered by their 
environment and their perceived risk.  Any positive shift in perceived environmental safety is 
accompanied by a reduction in their perceived risk" (Paton et al., 2008: 182).  Thus, top-down 
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education campaigns that make individuals feel more secure may cause a reduction in their 
preparedness.   
 
If individuals perceive and respond to risk information differently, how then do emergency 
managers create effective policies at the community level to positively influence decision-
making?  Although protective action decisions are made at the individual-level, risk 
information is almost always interpreted in the context of local knowledge; social interaction 
also plays an important role in this process (Paton et al., 2008).  Recent research on flood 
awareness (Burningham et al., 2008), climate change (Ford et al. 2007; Pearce et al. 2009), and 
volcanic eruptions (Paton et al., 2008) has recognized the need to engage community members 
in honest, two-way communication whenever community-level policy is developed.  
Numerous reasons have been supplied by researchers to support this recommendation, 
including: (1) Policy written without community consultation often does not take into account 
local needs or community concerns.  These policies may increase social vulnerability by 
undermining social networks, increasing conflict, and reducing flexibility, (2) Externally-
imposed policies are often met with resistance and resentment by community members, which 
often leads to the failure of the policy due to low participation and support, and (3) Community 
members have a wealth of local knowledge which can be used to supplement and support risk 
reduction policies.  Thus, emergency managers can create flexible and effective policies 
intended to improve individual decision-making by actively engaging the entire community. 
 
Identifying public awareness of (and concerns regarding) local disaster risk, and improving 
perception of these risks is one participatory adaptation method that could potentially reduce 
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social vulnerability.  As Gierlach et al. (2010:1548) explain: "Because levels of perceived risk 
are associated with self-protective behaviors, understanding how to meaningfully communicate 
risk information can lead to more accurate and timely behavioral changes rather than decisions 
based inappropriately on fear".  However, it is important to balance risk perception studies with 
risk assessments.  An over-emphasis on the public perception of risk can lead to the creation of 
ineffective and redundant hazard policies.  Conversely, researchers who only focus on the 
objective analysis of risk have no understanding of how individuals and communities receive, 
interpret, and respond to risk information.  Thus, researchers must address both the subjective 
and objective attributes of risk in order for social vulnerability to be effectively reduced. 
 
2.4 Tornadoes 
2.4.1 Physical characteristics and risk 
Tornadoes are among the most potentially destructive storms on Earth.  Broadly defined, a 
tornado is the violently rotating column of air that extends from the base of a cumulonimbus 
cloud to the ground.  These phenomena are "capable of creating incredible amounts of damage 
and significant numbers of fatalities and are, from a meteorological and climatological 
perspective, one of nature's most challenging perils" (Etkin et al., 2001: 915).  The challenging 
nature of tornadoes is a function of their rapid onset and development, their unpredictable 
behavior, and their complex, multi-scale impacts.   
 
Although tornadoes can occur at any time of the day or night, they typically occur in the late 
afternoon or early evening when the atmosphere is made unstable from intense daytime 
heating.  Tornadoes can occur anywhere in the world given the appropriate conditions, but 
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tornado frequency varies significantly across the globe.  Tornado activity within the United 
States accounts for almost 90% of all tornadic activity worldwide (Grazulis, 2001).  The 
United States experiences approximately 1000 tornadoes each year, which result in an annual 
average of 65 deaths and 1100 non-fatal injuries (Comstock and Mallonee, 2005).  Canada 
accounts for approximately 5% of all tornadic activity worldwide with an average of 80-100 
tornadoes occurring each year.  The majority of these tornadoes occur in southern Ontario, 
which is the northern most extent of North America’s “Tornado Alley”.   
 
The high frequency of tornadoes in North America is a function of the atmospheric mechanics 
necessary for the development of these storms.  Severe thunderstorms most readily develop 
when warm, moist air collides with cool, dry air, which results in atmospheric instability.  In 
North America, warm, moist air is drawn up from the Gulf of Mexico and cool, dry air is 
drawn down from Canada; when these conflicting air masses meet, the development of 
supercell thunderstorms is possible (Hyndman et al., 2009).  In addition to destructive 
tornadoes, mesoscale convective storms are also capable of producing torrential rainfall and 
large hail.  Hailstones in particular are capable of damaging agricultural crops, vehicles, and 
buildings, and they can cause serious injury to livestock or people.  It is estimated that damage 
from hailstones in the United States alone averages over $1.2 billion USD annually (NOAA, 
2011).   
 
The dominant classification scheme used in tornado research is the Fujita Scale of Tornado 
Intensity, which was developed in 1971 by Tetsuya "Ted" Fujita of the University of Chicago 
(Table 2.4).  The F-scale classifies tornadoes based on the damage they produce, as determined 
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by post-storm damage surveys (Grazulis, 2001).  Thus, wind speed is inferred from damage 
done rather than directly measured.  Tornadoes are capable of causing incredible destruction as 
they can produce wind speeds in excess of 500 kph.  This is especially relevant considering 
tornadoes produce both vertical and horizontal winds; vertical wind speeds in excess of 160 
kph can counteract the force of gravity, causing objects to become airborne (Grazulis, 2001).  
In these powerful storms, debris becomes dangerous projectiles capable of impaling buildings 
and vehicles, and causing significant injury or death.  In 2007, an Enhanced Fujita Scale (EF-
scale) was introduced in an attempt to more accurately align wind speed estimates with 
reported damage (Table 2.4).  Placement on the EF-Scale involves expert judgment of eight 
levels of damage to 28 indicators, including: homes and other buildings, towers, poles, and 
trees (SPC, 2004). 
 
2.4.2 Tornado forecasts and warnings 
Due to their rapid onset and development and their unpredictable behaviour, tornadic storms  
 
FUJITA SCALE ENHANCED FUJITA SCALE  
F-number Wind Speed (kph) EF-number Wind Speed (kph) Typical Damage 
F0   64 - 116 EF-0 105 - 137 Light damage 
F1 117 - 180 EF-1 138 - 178 Moderate damage 
F2 181 - 253 EF-2 179 - 218 Considerable damage 
F3 254 - 322 EF-3 219 - 266 Severe damage 
F4 333 - 418 EF-4 267 - 322 Devastating damage 
F5 419 - 512 EF-5  > 322 Incredible damage 
 
 
Table 2.4: The Fujita Scale and the Enhanced Fujita Scale.  Note that wind speed estimates are 
based on three-second gusts estimated at the point of damage. Modified from SPC (2004).   
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are one of the most challenging weather phenomena to accurately predict.  The National 
Weather Service (NWS) in the United States began issuing official watches and warnings for 
tornadoes in the 1950s (Grazulis, 2001).  The average tornado warning lead-time has since 
improved significantly due to advancements in forecasting technology, as well as recent 
improvements in the scientific understanding of tornadogenesis.  For example, the average 
warning lead-time was 0-3 minutes in the 1970s, whereas current average lead-time for 
tornadic storms is 13 minutes (Stensrud et al., 2009; Stalker et al., 2011).  The increased time 
between when a tornado warning is issued and when a tornadic storm impacts a community has 
significant implications for individual- and community-level disaster response.  
 
Although the accurate and timely posting of tornado watches and warnings is a significant 
factor in reducing deaths and injuries due to tornadoes, other factors have emerged in the 
literature as being equally significant, including: the ability to receive and understand official 
watches and warnings; access to suitable shelters; situational awareness of appropriate 
protective actions; and an accurate perception of tornado risk (Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002; 
Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Sherman-Morris, 2005; Donner, 2007; Ashley et al., 2008; 
Blanchard-Boehm and Cook, 2009; Schmidlin et al., 2009; Sherman-Morris, 2010).  These 
factors greatly influence individual- and community-level decision-making during tornado 
warnings and other high-risk events, and remain largely independent of a forecast centre’s 
ability to produce timely and accurate weather forecasts.   
 
2.4.3 Sources of severe weather information  
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It has been well established that most individuals in North America receive warning 
information from mass media sources, with television, outdoor warning sirens, and radio 
frequently cited as the most common public warning mediums (Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002; 
Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Sherman-Morris, 2005; Blanchard-Boehm and Cook, 2009; 
Schmidlin et al., 2009).  Television in particular can be highly effective at tornado warning 
dissemination.  For example, news outlets have the ability to interrupt regularly scheduled 
television programs to disseminate urgent warning information during periods of hazardous 
weather.  Television weathercasters may tailor their severe weather coverage to include 
graphics of storm track and intensity, as well as images of the storm and its aftermath.  This 
motivating information is unavailable from other popular warning mediums, such as tornado 
sirens or radio stations. Frequent viewers of television newscasts may also perceive 
camaraderie between themselves and their weather forecaster; this perceived bond between the 
viewing public and their weathercaster is referred to as a parasocial relationship.  It has been 
shown that viewers who develop a parasocial relationship with their weathercaster are more 
likely to follow his or her protective action advice during outbreaks of severe weather 
(Sherman-Morris, 2005).  
 
Although television, outdoor warning sirens, and radio remain the most commonly accessed 
modes of tornado warning dissemination, there is an emergent literature that examines the 
usefulness of social media as a source of disaster response and recovery information.  Social 
media refers to those web-based and mobile services that allow end-users to generate and share 
content, and to browse other users’ generated content (Hyvärinen and Saltikoff, 2010).  
Facebook and Twitter (with over 800 million and 140 million users, respectively) are two 
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examples of highly popular social networking services, both of which may be accessed through 
the Internet and mobile phone applications.   
 
Social media has several advantages over traditional media as a crisis communications tool.  
First, social media can be rapidly and continuously updated by numerous end-users throughout 
a severe weather event.  These updates can provide critical information that would otherwise 
be unavailable to weather forecasters and emergency management personnel located outside of 
the impact area.  Second, information can propagate rapidly on social media websites, reaching 
thousands (sometimes millions) of users within a relatively short timeframe.  Many social 
networking websites also allow users to share or search for content using hashtags or 
keywords, which further increases the accessibility of user-generated content.  A common and 
legitimate criticism of social networking websites is that it can be difficult to evaluate the 
credibility and validity of user-generated content (Jefferson, 2006; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; 
Hyvarinen and Saltikoff, 2010).  Gossip and misinformation (either intentional or 
unintentional) are common on social networking websites, and it can be a challenge for end-
users to differentiate between this content and more credible information.  This represents a 
potential source of vulnerability for those individuals who may rely on social media sources 
when seeking weather information.  
 
2.4.4 Social vulnerability and public response to tornadoes 
Due to their rapidity of onset and potential destructiveness, tornadoes represent a significant 
risk to human beings.  As with other disasters, social vulnerability to tornadoes is influenced by 
many variables, including: timing and rapidity of onset, public response to tornadoes, socio-
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economic status, previous experience with the hazard (either personal, or within the broader 
social context), and risk perception.  These variables can also influence an individual’s 
decision-making process during tornadic events.  Thus, it is important to understand the 
dynamic relationship(s) between these variables when trying to deconstruct a tornado disaster. 
 
The timing and rapidity of tornado onset has several important implications for social 
vulnerability to these severe storms.  First, the ideal warning lead-time is known to vary 
between different publics.  While individuals may only need several minutes to seek 
appropriate shelter, school administrators and hospital staff may need significantly longer to 
evacuate their facilities (Ewald and Guyer, 2002).  Interestingly, recent research suggests that 
longer warning lead-times do not always translate into lower risk, as reflected by mortality and 
injury rates (Doswell, 1999; Simmons and Sutter, 2008; Simmons and Sutter, 2009).  Longer 
warning lead times may be less effective because they convey a sense of competency and 
preparedness that may result in a reduction of perceived risk (Doswell, 1999).  This classic 
example of risk compensation may cause individuals to be less motivated to take appropriate 
protective actions.   
 
The timing of a tornado event can also influence social vulnerability.  Individuals are more 
likely to receive a tornado warning if it is issued during the time when people are awake and 
media sources are readily accessible.  It is also much easier to visually assess an approaching 
storm during the daytime than at night.  The ability to visually assess a storm has been shown 
to be an influential factor in the decision to take protective actions (Hammer and Schmidlin, 
2002; Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Sherman-Morris, 2010).  Recent research has shown that 
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mortality associated with nocturnal tornadoes has not shared the same rate of decline over the 
past century as those tornadoes occurring between sunrise and sunset (Ashley et al., 2008).  
Tornadoes that occur when people are typically at work, school, or in transit also represent a 
challenge, as these individuals may not have access to suitable shelter, or they may lack an 
emergency action plan.   
 
Public response to tornado watches and warnings can also substantially influence social 
vulnerability during these high-risk events.  A 'protective action' refers to the full range of 
actions taken to reduce the risk of injury or death, and to minimize the damage sustained to 
property.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the United States 
recommends a list of protective actions to take during a tornado warning (NOAA, 2010).  The 
safest place to take shelter during a tornado is an underground room, such as a basement or a 
storm cellar.  If underground shelter is not available, then it is recommended that individuals 
shelter in an interior room or a hallway on the lowest level of a sturdy building.  Individuals 
who are caught outdoors or who live in mobile homes are advised to go to the nearest sturdy 
building to take shelter immediately.  It is also strongly recommended that individuals shelter 
in situ for the duration of the severe weather event.  Other examples of protective actions that 
are often taken before severe weather arrives include: securing loose items, such as lawn 
furniture, and closing windows and doors.   
 
Socio-economic status influences vulnerability to tornadoes in many ways, both directly and 
indirectly.  Individuals in a low income bracket are more likely to reside in inadequate 
structures, such as mobile homes.  Mobile homes are notoriously vulnerable to even the 
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weakest tornadic winds, and offer no significant protection during these severe storms (Sutter 
and Simmons, 2010).  Recent research has shown that individuals in mobile homes are 12 
times more likely to receive serious injuries and 35 times more likely to be killed by a tornado 
than those individuals in well-built wood-framed houses (Daley et al., 2005; Schmidlin et al., 
2009).  Socio-economic status can also affect the technology to which an individual has 
frequent and reliable access.  It has been well established that communications technologies 
(e.g., televisions, radios, computers with Internet access, and cell phones) play an important 
role in the dissemination of warning information during tornado events (e.g., Hammer and 
Schmidlin, 2002; Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Sherman-Morris, 2005; Sherman-Morris, 
2010). Socio-economic status can also influence the range of available protective actions.  For 
example, individuals with higher incomes may be able to afford technologies that would assist 
in taking protective actions, such as weather radios, weather-related cell phone applications, 
motor vehicles, and personal storm shelters.   
 
Risk perception can also greatly affect individual-level vulnerability during tornado 
emergencies.  As previously discussed, risk perception has been shown to be the most 
influential factor in the decision-making process during times of crisis (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; 
Sitkin and Weingart, 1995; Pennings and Grossman, 2008).  Risk perception of tornadoes is 
influenced by numerous variables, including previous experience with damaging tornadoes, 
access to weather information, and personal attributes (e.g., age, gender, education).  Recent 
research is divided on the influence of previous hazard experience on risk perception and 
decision-making during subsequent events (Drobot et al., 2007).  Some researchers assert that 
previous experience with tornadoes will positively impact protective action decision-making in 
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subsequent events  (e.g., Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Mileti and Sorensen, 1987; Hammer 
and Schmidlin, 2002).  However, other research has shown that previous experience with 
damaging tornadoes does not necessarily influence individuals to be any more likely to make 
appropriate protective-action decisions during subsequent events (e.g., de Man and Simpson-
Housley, 1987; Liu et al., 1996; Balluz et al., 2000; Donner, 2007; Schmidlin et al., 2009).  
Therefore, any new research that examines the influence of two or more successive tornado 
events on a community could greatly contribute to the academic understanding of risk 






STUDY CONTEXT AND METHODS 
___________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction to the research problem  
3.1.1 Tornadoes in southern Ontario 
Southern Ontario is one of Canada's most active regions for severe weather.  A wide variety of 
weather-related hazards occur in the province annually, including: blizzards, floods, severe 
thunderstorms, and tornadoes.  An average of 80 tornadoes occur in Canada each year, which 
result in an annual average of 2 deaths, 20 injuries, and tens of millions of dollars in damages 
(Environment Canada, 2011b; Cao and Cai, 2011; Cao and Cai, 2008).  The Canadian region at 
the highest risk of tornadoes is southern Ontario (Etkin et al., 2001; Natural Resources Canada, 
2009; Conrad, 2009).  Based on assessments of tornado frequency, intensity, and tract, it has 
been determined that an F3 tornado affects southern Ontario every five years (Banik et al., 
2007); less intense tornadoes affect southern Ontario every year (Figure 3.1).  Given that 
southern Ontario accounts for approximately 35% of Canada’s total population (McGillivrary, 
2010), the tornado hazard in this region poses a significant risk to millions of Canadians 
(Figure 3.2) 
 
The average number of reported tornadoes in Ontario has increased since the 1970s (Banik et 
al., 2007).  As with similar trends in the United States, this apparent increase is at least partly 
the result of an observation bias.  As population density, forecasting accuracy, and public 





Figure 3.1:  The location of all confirmed and probable tornadoes that occurred 





Figure 3.2:  a) The geographic distribution of tornadoes in Canada (Source: Conrad, 2009, used 





actuality, tornado frequency in Ontario has been highly variable over the last three decades, 
with the 1980s being particularly active in Ontario, whereas the 1990s was a period of reduced 
tornado activity.  However, recent research has found that tornadic activity in southern Ontario 
may be increasing for the first time in sixty years independent of the observation bias discussed 
previously (Cao and Cai, 2011).  As tornadic activity is variable, so too are tornadic damages.  
Several notable tornado outbreaks have occurred in this region over the last three decades, 
including significant events in 1985, 2005, and 2009 (Environment Canada, 2011c).  The 1985 
Barrie tornado outbreak in southern Ontario, which resulted in 12 fatalities, 155 injuries, and 
approximately $250 million in damages, remains one of Canada's worst natural disasters 
(Allen, 1986).  
 
Despite the existing tornado risk in southern Ontario, there has been very little research 
published that investigates how individuals in this region obtain, interpret, and respond to 
severe weather information.  The purpose of this thesis research is to address this knowledge 
gap by determining how the publics in southern Ontario understand risk information pertaining 
to tornado warnings, and how these individuals make protective action decisions during these 
high-risk, short-notice disasters.  To achieve this objective, this research project examines two 
events that occurred in August, 2011 in Goderich, Ontario: an F3 tornado that impacted the 
community on August 21
st
 and a tornado warning that was posted for the region three days 
later on August 24
th
.  Semi-structured interviews (n=35) and close-ended questionnaires 
(n=268) were conducted to examine how individuals obtained, interpreted, and responded to 
risk information, and to assess how the experience of a damaging tornado on August 21
st
 
affected perception and response to a tornado warning on August 24
th
















3.1.2 Goderich, Ontario 
Goderich is a small town with a declining population of 7521 residents located on the shore of 
Lake Huron in Huron-Perth county of Ontario, Canada (Figure 3.3).  The town spans a total 
land area of 7.91 km
2
, with a population density of 950.8 persons/km
2
 (Statistics Canada, 
2012b).  The downtown core of Goderich is an octagonal traffic circle, which is referred to as 
the Courthouse Square or locally as "The Square".  The Square houses a number of businesses, 
including four banking institutions, two art galleries, the Hotel Bedford, and numerous 
specialty stores.  The Huron County Courthouse, which provides family, criminal, and court 
services for the region, is located at the center of The Square.  Many other public and 
municipal buildings are also located in or are adjacent to The Square, such as the Ontario 
Figure 3.3:  Goderich, Ontario (Harris, 2012) 
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Provincial Police station, Goderich Public Library, Goderich & District Chamber of 
Commerce, Canada Post, and the Goderich Town Hall.  As a regional service center, Goderich 
provides many retail, municipal, and economic functions for its surrounding communities.   
 
3.1.3 The August 21
st
 Goderich, Ontario tornado 
Goderich experienced several periods of unsettled weather throughout the early afternoon on 
August 21
st
, with rain, hail, and wind affecting the town shortly after noon.  At 2:02 pm on 
August 21
st
, 2011 a severe thunderstorm watch was posted for Huron-Perth Counties by 
Environment Canada.  Although there was not a separate tornado watch posted at this time, the 
possibility of a tornado was mentioned in the text of the severe thunderstorm watch.  
Approximately one hour later, an isolated supercell thunderstorm moved over Lake Huron and 
intensified as it approached the town of Goderich.  At this time, Doppler radar showed an 
organized severe thunderstorm with a characteristic "hook echo" (Figure 3.4), which is 
indicative of intense rotation associated with tornadoes.  At 3:48 pm on August 21
st
, 
Environment Canada issued a tornado warning for Goderich, Ontario, as well as most of the 
surrounding area and southern Lake Huron (Environment Canada, 2011a) .   
 
Approximately 10 minutes after the tornado warning was issued by Environment Canada, the 
storm came ashore into the town of Goderich.  The tornado stayed on the ground for two  
minutes; during this time, it traveled 20 kilometers in a southeasterly direction, leaving behind 
a damage path between 200 meters and 1.5 kilometers wide (Stockton, 2011; Environment 
Canada, 2011c).  As a result of the tornado, one individual lost his life and at least 39 others 

















survey conducted the following day, Environment Canada classified the tornado as an F3, with 
maximum wind speeds of 280 km/hr.  Shortly after the storm had passed, Goderich Mayor Deb 
Shewfelt declared a state of emergency, and on Monday, August 22
nd
 Premier Dalton 
McGuinty told the  press that the province had enacted its emergency plan to assist Goderich 




 Goderich tornado was the strongest tornado to affect southern Ontario in 15 
years.  The storm damage in Goderich was extensive, particularly in the downtown core around 
the Courthouse Square.  Due to damaged lines in the area, natural gas service was cut off to 
Figure 3.4:  Radar reflectivity of the tornado-warned storm as it approached Goderich, 
Ontario on August 21
st
, 2011.  Note the characteristic "hook echo" in the lower-middle of 
the figure.  (Source: Wunderground.com, 2011. Used with permission). 
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about 3,300 customers around 10:00 pm that evening.  Many buildings received serious 
structural damage, including residential and commercial buildings, the Sifto Salt Mine, and the 
Goderich Courthouse.  A number of buildings were destroyed by the tornado, including the 
Victoria Street United Church, while others were damaged beyond repair and were 
subsequently approved for demolition.  As of September 21
st
, 2011, the Goderich tornado has 
cost at least $75 million dollars in insured damages (IBC, 2011).   
 
3.1.4 The August 24
th
 severe storm system 
Early in the day on August 24
th
, 2011 both Environment Canada and the Storm Prediction 
Center (SPC) in the United States recognized that several atmospheric conditions necessary for 
the development of severe thunderstorms would converge over southern Ontario and the upper 
mid-west.  By early morning, Environment Canada had issued a tornado watch for large 
portions of southern Ontario, including the town of Goderich.  The text of the watch indicated 
that severe thunderstorms with heavy rains, damaging winds, large hail, and destructive 
tornadoes were possible.  Throughout the day, Environment Canada extended the tornado 
watch to encompass most of southern Ontario.  By late afternoon, numerous severe 
thunderstorm cells began to develop and track across southern Ontario.  In response, 
Environment Canada upgraded the tornado watch to a tornado warning for the Goderich region 
at 6:30 pm on August 24
th
.  Although no tornadoes were reported in Goderich, this storm 
system did cause heavy rainfall and strong winds in the region.  The storm system was also 
responsible for three confirmed tornadoes in southern Ontario: an F1 tornado touched down in 
Nairn and in Cambridge, while an F0 tornado occurred in Neustadt (Environment Canada, 
2011c).   
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3.2 Research procedure 
3.2.1 Previous research on perception of and response to natural hazards 
The vast majority of the existing research on the perception of natural hazards has taken the 
form of close-ended surveys distributed to a random sample (e.g., de Man and Simpson-
Housley, 1987; Sherman-Morris, 2005; Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002; Sheridan, 2007; Zhang 
et al., 2007; Schmidlin et al., 2009; Sherman-Morris, 2010).  Although fewer studies have been 
conducted using in-person interviews (e.g., Wong and Yan, 2002; Donner, 2007; Burningham 
et al., 2008) or focus groups (e.g., Zeigler et al., 1996; Moore et al., 2004; Tekeli-Yeşil et al., 
2010), qualitative methods can also be highly effective in hazards research.  According to 
McGuirk and O'Neill (2010) there are four types of knowledge that can be accessed through 
social science research: attributes, behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs.  Attributes and behaviors 
are well suited for quantitative methods, but attitudes and beliefs are more subtle and nuanced.  
These forms of information are best accessed through qualitative methods that engage and 
encourage participants to divulge information beyond the surface level (McGuirk and O'Neill, 
2010).  Thus, a blended methods approach (i.e., a research framework that incorporates both 
interviews and questionnaires) can be highly effective when studying experiences and 
perceptions of natural hazards (e.g., Murphy et al., 2005).   
 
3.3 Methods of data collection  
3.3.1 Interview script 
The interview script was developed to investigate several themes related to the research 
objectives, including: general weather knowledge; usage of current communications 
technologies; and perceptions of and responses to the tornado hazard.  Many questions that 
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appeared in the interview script were drawn from previous studies that examined tornado 
perception and response in the United States (e.g., Donner, 2007; Sherman-Morris, 2010; 
Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002; Schmidlin et al., 2009).  Once 
the interview script was completed in draft form, it was sent to several hazards researchers for 
feedback on clarity and completeness.  Based on the feedback received from these individuals, 
the interview script was edited to add several questions on general weather knowledge and cell 
phone usage.  The final interview script was organized into five sections: 
 
SECTION A:  General Weather Questions 
The questions in this section were intended to gain an understanding of how respondents 
obtained and utilized weather products, such as forecasts and weather warnings.  Respondents 
were asked where and how often they obtained weather information, and about what motivates 
them to check the weather on a typical day.  Questions in this section also probed respondents' 
understandings of weather forecasts and warnings.  For example, respondents were asked to 
explain the difference between a weather watch and a weather warning in their own words.  
Finally, respondents were asked to describe the best way(s) for forecast centers to warn them 
about impending severe weather (e.g., television broadcast, text message, or radio broadcast).   
 
SECTION B:  August 21
st
, 2011 Goderich Tornado 
Questions in this section were designed to investigate respondent's experiences and attitudes 
throughout the day on August 21
st
, 2011.  Respondents were first asked several questions that 
required them to reflect on their whereabouts and activities prior to the tornado's impact.   
Respondents were then asked questions about their situational awareness throughout the day 
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(e.g., "When did you first notice the inclement weather?" and "Were you aware that 
Environment Canada has issued a severe thunderstorm watch for Huron-Perth at 2:02 pm on 
August 21
st
?").  Finally, respondents were asked about their experiences and actions during and 
immediately after the tornado.  Specifically, questions in this section probed respondents' 
protective-action decisions during the tornado event, and their experiences in the hours that 
followed.  The term 'protective action' was defined for participants as any sort of action that they 
took to prevent injury to themselves or others, or to minimize damages (such as going to the basement, 
shutting or opening windows, or hiding in a bathtub).   
 
SECTION C:  August 24
th
, 2011 Severe Storm System 
The severe storm system that affected southern Ontario on August 24
th
 provided the 
opportunity to investigate how previous experience with a damaging tornado influenced 
protective-action decision-making during a subsequent event.  The questions in this section 
were intended to probe respondents' experiences, perceptions, and behaviors throughout the 
day on August 24
th
.  As these interview questions were intended to examine the differences and 
similarities in perceptions and behaviors between these two events, many of the questions were 
comparative in nature (e.g., "Did you take protective action for this storm that was different 
than what you did on August 21
st
?").  Other questions probed respondents' general perceptions 
of their community during the day on August 24
th
.   
 
SECTION D:  Cell phone and Social Media Usage 
One of the primary thrusts of this research project was to understand how individuals obtained, 
interpreted, and disseminated important information before, during, and after a short-notice 
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disaster.  Questions in this section were designed to investigate how individuals used current 
communications technologies (e.g., social media, mobile phones, and the Internet) on August 
21
st
 and August 24
th
.  Specifically, respondents were asked to describe how they used their 
mobile phones and social media to communicate with friends and family during and after each 
of these two events.  Respondents were also probed to determine what role these 
communications technologies played in the short- and long-term recovery process.   
 
SECTION E:  Demographics 
The final section of the interview script contained questions regarding respondent 
demographics.  The purpose of these questions was to gather information on relevant 
characteristics (e.g., gender, age, income, level of education) known to influence vulnerability, 
risk perception, risk propensity, and decision-making.  These questions were asked with the 
intention of comparing answers between respondents.   
 
3.3.2 Interview Recruitment 
One of the primary goals of this research project was to determine the role(s) that current 
communications technologies (e.g., social media, mass media, cellular phones) played in the 
warning and response process during the Goderich tornado.  To that end, a non-probability 
purposive sample was thought to be an appropriate sampling method for this research.  
Respondents were invited to participate in the project through advertisements placed on 
Facebook groups associated with the Goderich tornado.  Specifically, recruitment scripts were 
posted to the 'Goderich Ontario Tornado victims and support', 'Save Downtown Goderich', and 
'Goderich Tornado Clean-up Hub' Facebook groups.  A recruitment script was also posted on 
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the 'Ontario Storms Site' message board, a forum for storm spotters and severe weather 
enthusiasts in southern Ontario.  To further raise interest in and awareness of the project, the 
student researcher was also interviewed by a number of local media outlets, including: 104.9 
The Beach (local radio station), the Goderich Signal Star (local print newspaper), and Huron 
Bullet News (local community news website).  
 
3.3.3 Pre-project Goderich community meeting 
On Monday, October 3
rd
 a pre-project community meeting was held at the Goderich public 
library.  This meeting was arranged through and advertised on several Facebook groups, most 
notably the 'Goderich Tornado victims and support' group.  The community meeting provided 
the opportunity to discuss the research project with Goderich residents.  There were two 
notable outcomes of this meeting:  first, the attendees were able to provide feedback on the 
interview script, and on issues facing the community since the August 21
st
 tornado.  Second, 
the community meeting served to further raise interest in and awareness of the research project.  
Several attendees of the community meeting went on to participate in the research project 
themselves, and/or to encourage affected individuals in the community to contact the student 
researcher.   
 
3.3.4 Interview process 
All interviews conducted as a part of this research project took the form of semi-structured 
conversations that followed a script, but still allowed for flexibility and spontaneity of inquiry 
(Dunn, 2010).  The interviews began on October 4
th
, 2011 and finished on November 17
th
, 
2011; during this period, a total of 35 participants were interviewed.  Interviews varied in 
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length from less than 25 minutes to over 80 minutes, with most interviews lasting 
approximately 45 minutes.  The interviews were held at a time and a location that was 
convenient and accessible for both the student researcher and the participants.  Most interviews 
took place at the Goderich Public Library, located in downtown Goderich.  Other interviews 
took place at public offices, or, in exceptional circumstances, by telephone (n=3).    
 
3.3.5 Questionnaires 
Due to considerable community interest in this thesis research, it was decided by mid-
November, 2011 to develop and distribute a close-ended questionnaire.  The main purpose of 
the questionnaire was to determine the extent to which insights from the interviews were 
generalizable to a larger population.  A secondary purpose was to provide the residents of 
Goderich with a quick and simple opportunity to share their experiences during and after the 
August 21
st
 tornado.  The questionnaire was developed based on the suggestions of Dillman et 
al. (2009) and McGuirk and O'Neill (2010).  The general structure of the questionnaire was 
similar to that of the interview script, but several questions were added based on insights 
gained from the interviews.  These additional questions probed such topics as trust in issued 
forecasts; damages to businesses; and community meetings.  An additional section was also 
added to explore respondent’s experiences and perceptions throughout the long-term recovery 
period.  This section contained 19 questions that explored sense of place, place attachments, 
and feelings of loss due to the disaster. 
 
3.3.6 Questionnaire recruitment 
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As with the in-person interviews, several methods were used to advertise the questionnaire.  
First, an on-line version of the questionnaire was created using Surveymonkey.com.  The on-
line survey went live on December 27
th
, 2011 and remained available until March 15
th
, 2012.  
A recruitment script for the on-line survey was posted to the Facebook groups that had been 
previously used to advertise for the interviews.  Second, paper copies of the questionnaire were 
printed and left at the Goderich Public Library by a visible display that contained information 
on the research project.  Individuals who completed these questionnaires were able to place 
them in a sealed envelope and leave them at the library for pick-up.  Finally, an undergraduate 
student researcher conducted a systematic random sample through a door-to-door survey 
during two weekends in February 2012. In this random sample, every fifth residential home on 
12 randomly selected streets was visited to solicit participation in the study.  If no one was 
home at the time of the visit, the student researcher left an information letter that explained the 
research project and provided the hyperlink to the on-line questionnaire.   
 
3.4 Data analysis 
The interviews were first transcribed and then analyzed for content using thematic analysis to 
observe response patterns in the interview transcripts.  The results of the questionnaire were 
downloaded from Surveymonkey.com and formatted for analysis in the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) software.  SPSS was used to determine percent frequencies and 
means, and to document relationships between variables and across respondent groups using 
cross-tabulation.  Statistical significance was determined using Chi-Square analysis.  More 








A total of 35 interviews were conducted with Goderich area residents from October to 
November, 2011.  The purpose of these interviews was to gain insight into the different 
perspectives and experiences of those Goderich area residents and visitors who were either 
directly or indirectly affected by the August 21
st
 tornado.  The interviews were also designed to 
gain an understanding of the complex factors that motivated protective behaviours on August 
21
st
 and August 24
th
, such as risk perception, self-efficacy, and previous disaster experience.   
 
This chapter will begin with a brief overview of the socio-demographics of the interview 
participants, as well as an in-depth examination of two respondent profiles.  The in-depth 
analysis of the respondent profiles is intended to illustrate the diverse range of experiences and 
perspectives reported among the interview participants.  The remainder of the chapter will 
focus on the results of the thematic analysis of the interview transcripts.  These results will be 
presented under the same headings that appeared in the interview script (e.g., general weather 
knowledge; the August 21
st
 tornado; and the August 24
th
 storm system).  Additional sections 
have been added to explore relevant trends that frequently appeared throughout the interview 
process (e.g., risk communication, risk perception, and long-term recovery).  The chapter will 
conclude with a brief discussion on the similarities and differences between the interview 




In full compliance with the University of Waterloo's Office of Research Ethnics (ORE) 
guidelines for research involving human subjects, all results will be presented with the 
participants' full confidentiality and anonymity in mind.  To that end, no personally identifying 
information will be provided, either in the two results chapters or in the subsequent discussion 
chapter.  All of the written quotations will include a pseudonym and age of the speaker.  This 
information is provided for contextual purposes only, and cannot be used to identify any of the 
participants in this study.   
 
4.1 Participant demographics 
A total of 35 participants were interviewed between October 4
th
 and November 17
th
, 2011.  
This sample size is consistent with several other research projects on severe weather perception 
and response that utilized in-person interviews and focus groups in their methodology (e.g., 
Moore et al., 2004; Zeigler et al., 1996; Donner 2007).  The sample was composed of 20 
females and 15 males, which is a more balanced gender ratio than was present in the 
questionnaire sample.  This discrepancy may be partially explained by the request of three 
participants to be interviewed with their opposite-sex partners.  The remaining socio-
demographic characteristics of the interview participants (outlined below) are reasonably 
similar to those of the questionnaire respondents.   
 
The ages of the participants ranged from 20 to 74 years old, with the median age being 47 
years.  In terms of employment status, most participants were employed either full- or part-
time before August 21
st
, 2011.  Five individuals indicated that they were unemployed, and five 
respondents were outside of the workforce (either retired or student status).  The occupations of 
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the interview participants were diverse, and included positions from a wide range of industries 
(e.g., health care and social sciences, educational services, construction, business services, 
finance and real estate, retail trade, and tourism).  The gross household income for participants 
ranged from less than $20,000 to over $150,000 annually, with a median value of $70,000.  
The majority of interview respondents indicated that they have lived in the Goderich area for 
over five years, with many participants having lived in Goderich for most of their lives.   
 
4.2 Respondent profiles 
In order to gain an understanding of the diverse range of experiences and behaviours cited 
among the participants, two of the interviewees were selected for in-depth analysis.  These two 
respondents were chosen to be profiled because they are illustrative of the larger sample set, 
both in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics and in their experiences during and 
after the August 21
st
 tornado.  Meet Abigail and William.   
 
4.2.1 Profile 1:  Abigail 
Abigail is a 28-year-old university graduate who has lived in the Goderich region for most of 
her life.  Prior to the August 21
st
 tornado, Abigail would have described herself as not being 
particularly interested in the weather.  In general, she would only check the forecast if there 
was a special reason for her to do so (such as an outdoor event or a trip), and she could go days 
without really thinking about the weather.  Although Abigail had a general understanding of 
the different products published by Environment Canada, she acknowledged that she was not 






, 2011, Abigail was enjoying one of the last days of summer with her sister and 
her fiancé.  It was a quiet Sunday afternoon, and Abigail decided that she was in the mood to 
bake something.  An inspection of her cupboards revealed that she was out of several 
ingredients, so she grabbed her car keys and headed to the grocery store.  By the time she had 
found her items and gone through the checkout, Abigail noticed that the sunny morning had 
turned dark.  The wind had picked up, and it had started to hail.  Although the stormy weather 
was inconvenient, Abigail did not pay it much attention as she got into her car and headed 
home.  After all, as a life-long Goderich resident, Abigail was used to severe weather blowing 
in off of the lake. 
 
Around the time that Abigail returned home, the stormy weather had passed and the sun was 
shining again.  By 3:30 p.m. that afternoon, Abigail was at home with her sister and her fiancé 
as her pastries baked in the oven.  Together, they chatted about nothing in particular–what to 
have for supper, what to do next weekend–while Abigail cleaned up.  Suddenly, all of the 
power went out in the house.  Abigail glanced outside and noted that it was cloudy but 
otherwise calm.  Surprised by the sudden power loss and irritated at the potential loss of her 
pastries, Abigail complained to her fiancé.  However, before he could do anything to 
investigate the cause of the power loss, it began to rain.  The sudden onset of heavy rain was 
surprising, and together Abigail, her fiancé, and her sister went to watch the weather on the 
porch.   
 
Before they could reach the front door, the storm had intensified.  The sky was dark, and heavy 
wind and hail accompanied the first flash of lightning.  As they stared in astonishment at the 
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intensity of the storm, the large trees that lined their street began to bend in the wind.  Leaves 
and branches ripped off and went flying, and larger tree limbs followed in rapid succession.  
As the skies continued to darken, Abigail looked at her fiancé and her sister nervously.  After a 
brief discussion, they decided to take shelter together, and, with the roar of the storm following 
them, they headed to the basement.  Before they could reach the bottom of the basement steps, 
they were met with an eerie quiet.  Unsure whether the storm was truly over, they waited for a 
few minutes.  Abigail's fiancé was the first to go back upstairs, and within several moments his 
voice called down to them: 
 
"You should come out and look at this".   
 
Abigail recalled being shocked at the destruction that had occurred in the few moments since 
they had been upstairs.  One of the living room windows had been blown out, and glass and 
bits of debris littered the floor.  Two 40-foot tall trees in her backyard, a spruce and a birch, 
had been uprooted by the wind and had fallen over.  One of the trees pinned down a section of 
the fence that separated Abigail's yard from her neighbour's, but the rest of the fence was 
nowhere to be seen.  Pieces of debris, including lawn furniture, uprooted vegetation, and 
housing materials, were scattered everywhere.   
 
In the hours following the storm, Abigail and her fiancé checked on family members and 
neighbours to make sure that they were all right.  Abigail recalled the anxiety she felt as a 
result of the patchy cell-phone service immediately following the tornado, which made her 
unable to contact family members by telephone.  In response to this connectivity issue, 
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Abigail's fiancé traveled around town by bicycle to ensure that family members were safe.  
After all of their loved ones had been contacted and accounted for, Abigail and her fiancé went 
into the streets.  As she remarked, they “kind of wandered around, like zombies”.  Abigail 
remembered her neighbours running up and down the street, and hearing people call to each 
other, "Have you checked this house?  Has anyone checked this house yet?"  Several hours 
later, Abigail and her fiancé came across a first responder whom they asked for information on 
the extent of the storm.  The first responder replied, "I think it's the whole town". 
 
That evening, Abigail and her fiancé went to her mother-in-law's home in the south part of 
town, an area that was comparatively less damaged by the tornado.  Here Abigail was able to 
access the Internet and cable television, which she used to connect with Environment Canada 
and the Weather Network, respectively.  Once cellular service was restored to the area, which 
Abigail remembers as having occurred that same evening, she was also able to send and 
receive text messages to friends and family in other areas of the country.  Most of the 
information regarding the storm and post-disaster recovery that Abigail received in the 
following days came from the television and from Facebook, which she frequently accessed 
following the disaster. 
 
Abigail would describe her experiences on Wednesday, August 24
th
 as hectic.  As soon as the 
tornado watch was posted for the Goderich region, Abigail began to receive text messages, 
telephone calls, and Facebook messages from friends and family across the country.  As she 
recalls, “As soon as [the tornado watch] got posted, my phone was beeping like crazy".  
Although she acknowledges that there was an increased awareness of the weather among 
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Goderich residents that afternoon, Abigail was not anxious about the possibility of a second 
tornado.  In fact, when her mother-in-law suggested that the family spend the day in the 
basement, Abigail and her fiancé laughed at the idea.  However, when the sky got dark and it 
began to get windy that afternoon, Abigail described herself as feeling ‘extremely panicked’.  
At this point, Abigail and her family decided to go down to the basement, despite not having 
received news that the tornado watch had been upgraded to a tornado warning.  The family 
stayed in the basement until they could hear the wind and the rain begin to abate, which was 
only a few moments.  After that, they went back upstairs and returned to their previous 
activities. 
 
4.2.2 Profile 2:  William 
William is a 44-year-old family man who has lived and worked in the Goderich region for 
most of his life.  As a member of the law enforcement sector, William acknowledges that much 
of his weather awareness is related to his job.  As he explained, the weather influences the 
operational needs of his department; thus, he must have an accurate and up-to-date 
understanding of any potentially inclement weather in order to plan for public events, such as 
concerts or rallies, and to address any hazardous issues, such as unsafe roads.  In his personal 
life, William does not tend to actively check the weather, although he passively obtains 




, 2011, William was enjoying a day off from work.  He and his wife had 
decided to run some errands that morning, so they left for London around 10:00 a.m.  As 
William recalls, the drive to London was pleasant, with high clouds and intermittent sun.  On 
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their way back to Goderich that afternoon, he and his wife stopped in at an apple orchard along 
Highway 8.  They chatted with other customers as they gathered their produce and waited to 
pay for their items.  The wind picked up as they waited in line, and by the time they were ready 
to make their purchase, it had begun to rain.  Shortly thereafter, the rain changed to hail and 
everyone hurried to the nearby buildings for shelter.  As William recalls, the hail lasted 
approximately 10 to 15 seconds, although the heavy rain lasted quite a bit longer.  Once the 
rain eased up, he and his wife paid for their produce and headed for their car.  They were in a 
hurry to make it to The Square before the shops closed at 4:00 p.m., as they needed to pick up a 
few last-minute items for dinner that evening.  The drive to the Square was short, and William 
pulled into a parking spot right across from the Burger Bar at approximately 3:45 p.m.  As he 
got out of the car, he noticed that the sky was cloudy but it was otherwise calm.  Together, 
William and his wife entered the specialty market at approximately 3:50 p.m.   
 
The market was quiet so close to closing time on a Sunday afternoon.  William and his wife 
chatted with the owner as they browsed the shop for their items.  The large storefront windows 
provided a clear view of the Courthouse Square, and William noticed that it had grown dark in 
the short time that they had been inside.  Suddenly, the lights inside the store began to flicker.  
William and his wife made their way to the cash register at the back of the store, eager to pay 
for their items in case the electricity went out.  Before they reached the register, the sound of 
the wind abruptly picking up caused William to pause and glance toward the front of the store.  
Through the windows, he could see the big trees in the Courtyard begin to sway in the wind.  




At first, William was intrigued by the intensity of the wind and rain.  As a long time Goderich 
area resident, he was used to storms blowing in off of the lake.  Thus, when the rain became 
mixed with hail, William did not think anything was out of the ordinary.  But then, the storm 
began to rapidly intensify into something that was unlike anything William had ever 
experienced.   The wind began to howl and the large trees in the Courtyard Square began to 
bend, at first in one direction and then in the opposite direction.  As William watched, the large 
gazebo that was directly across the road from the store was lifted off of its foundation slightly, 
and then it completely collapsed.  Immediately thereafter, trees began to fall over ‘like bowling 
pins’, one after the other.  William remembers his wife saying matter-of-factly, “It’s a 
tornado”.   
 
At once, everyone began to back away from the large storefront windows as trees continued to 
fall in the Square.  William remembers that his biggest concern in that moment was protecting 
his wife; he was particularly worried about the glass windows shattering and injuring her.  As 
they continued to back up, the ceiling began to buckle above them and tiles began to drop to 
the floor.  At that moment, the storeowner told everyone to get to the back of the building.  As 
they all hurried past the archway into the back of the store, the backdoor blew open under the 
force of the wind.  William recalled taking shelter between the backdoor and a large freezer 
that went all the way to the ceiling.  He remembers thinking that they would be protected 
between these two structures if the roof caved in on them.  From his vantage point, William 
had a clear view of the storefront windows.  As he recalls, it was as though a snow squall had 




William and the others stayed in the back of the store for only a few moments before the storm 
began to subside.  It was at that point that William got his first glimpse of the damage caused 
by the storm.  As he recalled, “It’s just complete devastation, it looked like a bomb had gone 
off”.  After the shock of their experience began to wear off, William’s wife became frantic 
over the whereabouts of their children.  Immediately, William called their home phone.  No 
answer.  Then he tried to call his daughter’s cell phone.  No answer.  William remembers 
thinking to himself that he could not comfort his wife, that he could not say to her ‘Don’t 
worry, everything will be fine’ because he knew, by looking outside, that their children might 
not be okay.  It was not until William returned home that he was able to confirm that both of 
his children were all right.   
 
Once he was certain that his children were safe, William immediately switched over to his role 
as a first responder.  Leaving his wife to handle the task of contacting friends and family, 
William quickly got dressed and headed back to the Courthouse Square. One of his top 
priorities in the coming hours was to cordon off the downtown core and evacuate everyone out 
of the area.  The reasons for this were two-fold: first, the buildings in and around the Square 
had sustained serious structural damages.  Second, numerous natural gas lines had been 
ruptured by the storm, and the smell of gas filled the Square.  Another priority was to establish 
a ‘safe space’ for individuals to go for shelter and information; the decision was made to 
contact the Knights of Columbus center and, if it was operational, to get it open for the public 






, 2011, William was still deeply involved in the post-tornado recovery process; 
as a result, he learned about the tornado watch very soon after it was posted that morning.  
William was home for much of the day on August 24
th
 with the television tuned in to weather 
and news updates.  William remembers numerous times when the news was interrupted to give 
the latest updates on the weather system.  Although William understood the hyper-vigilance, he 
felt that it might create a sense of paranoia and fear among the local viewership.  Later in the 
afternoon, when the weather began to look foreboding, William asked his children go into the 
basement with his parents while he watched the weather conditions from the top of the stairs.  
He waited until he felt that the weather had eased up slightly, and then called for them to come 
back upstairs.  William was hesitant to insist that his children stay in the basement for the 
duration of the storm; on one hand, their safety was his top priority, but on the other hand he 
did not want to frighten them unnecessarily.   
 
4.2.3 Comparison of the two profiles 
Together, Abigail and William represent many of the experiences commonly reported by the 
interview participants.  Both of these participants experienced the severe storm on August 21
st
, 
and both took protective action without knowing that Environment Canada had issued a 
tornado warning.  Instead, Abigail and William decided to take shelter as a result of the 
disturbing audio-visual stimuli (e.g., strong wind, heavy rain and hail, and seeing trees bending 
in the wind) that they witnessed.  After the tornado had passed, the first concern of both 
participants was to contact their family to ensure that everyone was okay.  They both 
experienced a significant amount of anxiety as a result of being unable to communicate with 
loved ones by telephone or text message in the hour after the tornado.  
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Abigail and William both recalled a significant amount of discussion by friends and family 
about the tornado warning on August 24
th
.  However, both participants thought that the hyper-
vigilance was overdone.  This is interesting, given that they had experienced a damaging 
tornado just three days prior.  Abigail and William also indicated that they were not overly 
concerned about the tornado watch, and that they thought it was highly unlikely a second 
tornado would impact the town.  Neither Abigail nor William took protective action on August 
24
th
 as a result of the Environment Canada tornado watch or warning; instead, they took 
protective action (or, in William’s case, asked his children to take protective action) when they 
thought the weather began to look threatening outside.  Both respondents only sheltered for a 
few minutes before they came back upstairs.   
 
Since her experiences on August 21
st
 and August 24
th
, Abigail admits that her perspectives on 
weather in the Goderich region have changed.  Prior to August 21
st
, Abigail did not believe it 
was even possible for a tornado to impact the town.  In fact, Abigail recalled being taught in 
her high school geography class that any tornadic system coming in off of the lake would be 
forced to rise over Goderich once it came in contact with the steep bluffs that separate the town 
from Lake Huron.  Since her experiences in August 2011, Abigail acknowledges that she is 
more aware of the weather and that she tends to check the forecast more often than previously, 
especially if severe weather has been forecasted for her region. 
 
Like Abigail, William was also familiar with the local belief that the bluffs would protect 
Goderich from a tornado.  However, unlike Abigail, William acknowledges that he is not likely 
to be any more cautious than he was before his experiences on August 21
st
.  William believes 
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that he is by no means unique in this regard, and he predicts that, as time moves on, 
‘numbness’ will settle in on the town as individuals return to their old behaviours (such as 
downplaying weather warnings).  As he explains, “Some people may change, but a lot of 
people will still go down to the beach to watch the storms come in.  It’s just the way it is”.   
 
4.3 Thematic Analysis 
4.3.1 General weather knowledge 
Most participants check the weather forecast for pragmatic reasons (e.g., deciding clothing or 
planning a trip).  A few respondents check the weather multiple times per day, but most of 
these individuals self-identified as ‘weather enthusiasts’.  Average weather consumers tend to 
check the Environment Canada website, the Weather Network television station, or the local 
radio station for weather information.  Weather enthusiasts tend to be more aware of higher-
level weather products, such as radar and operational analysis charts.  Weather enthusiasts are 
also more likely to access a variety of weather products and websites (including 
accuweather.com and wunderground.com) to assist with their weather related decision-making.    
 
Most participants had a general understanding of the difference between a weather watch and a 
weather warning.  Many people indicated that a weather watch was 'less severe' than a 
warning, and that a weather warning was 'more imminent'.  As Violet (25-years-old) explained: 
 "Um, a watch is just to, you know, be aware that there’s something that could be going 
through. A warning is a little bit more severe, I do believe . . . A watch is just, you know, 'Pay 
attention', and a warning is 'Now it’s coming so just be careful'."   
 
A few interviewees were able to fully define both terms, but ten respondents were unable to  
differentiate between the two.  Several participants also acknowledged that they did not realize 
that Environment Canada issued both watches and warnings.  The majority of participants said 
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that they were very familiar with the weather patterns in the Goderich region, and most agreed 
that they were used to severe weather blowing in off of the lake: 
“When you live on the lake, you know, when fronts come across, it’s not a big deal.  In fact, in 
this town a lot of times, if you know there’s a good storm coming, people will go down to the 
lake to watch the storm come across . . . We all do it.”  (William, 44-years-old) 
Most participants also agreed that they were more aware of winter severe weather than summer 
severe weather.  Many people cited the snow squalls common in the Goderich region as the 
reason for this differential awareness. 
 
Participants were also asked about the best way(s) to disseminate a weather warning to a 
community.  Although there were many different suggestions (e.g., radio broadcast, television 
broadcast, cell phone “app” notification), most people said that a text message or an automated 
telephone call would be their most preferred method of warning communication.  As William 
(44-years-old) explained:   
“So many people carry cell phones . . . There’s nothing else that in today’s society anybody 
carries with them, because everything else you’ve got to turn on, go seek out.  If it’s a 
computer, you gotta turn it on or go look for it.  If it’s a radio, you’ve gotta either be in your car 
with the radio on or, you know, in a building with that.  And TV, you gotta wait for a time [that 
the weather is] gonna be on.  A cell phone is with you no matter where you go.  No matter what 
phone it is, [a text message] will come."   
 
Several participants said that they wanted the town to install warning sirens to communicate 
future weather warnings.  This finding is interesting given that the question did not stipulate 
what type of weather warning was to be communicated.  Finally, no one indicated that a 
weather radio was his or her preferred method of warning communication.  This is 
unsurprising, given that only eight individuals knew about Environment Canada’s weather 






, 2011 tornado  
Most of the interview participants were in the Goderich region on August 21
st
, 2011.  Since it 
was one of the last Sundays of the summer, many people were either at home or at their 
cottages outside of town.  A few people indicated that they had to work or run errands that 
afternoon, and several people were out of town on vacation.  Most people who were in 
Goderich said that they first noticed the inclement weather early in the day when a storm 
system, which brought rain, hail, and high winds, blew through the area.  Everyone who 
experienced this storm agreed that they paid it little attention since they were used to inclement 
weather blowing in off of the lake.  Accordingly, only a few of the participants paid any 
attention to the weather when the rain started again just before 4:00 p.m. that afternoon: 
“So when the hail starts, we’re going ‘Oh look at that, here comes the hail’, which is no big 
deal, ‘cause 20 minutes earlier there had been some hail.” (William, 44-years-old) 
 
"We had a small thunderstorm around lunchtime and, um, that—I just thought that day was 
going to be that type of a day . . . so [when the tornado came] I thought “Oh it’s just another 
small storm of heavy rain.” (Jerome, 49-years-old) 
 
“I would say there were like three storm systems that rolled through. Uh, one first thing in the 
morning and then it stopped, and then another one, I’m gonna say early afternoon, and then it 
stopped. Uh, and then, and then when the tornado one came in you just thought, ‘Okay, here, 
here comes another one’.” (John, 60-years-old) 
 
“It was kind of a . . . crummy day, I think.  It had been raining, but nothing about it struck me 




Only a few participants indicated that they checked the weather forecast that afternoon, and 
only two people said it was in response to the inclement weather.  Unsurprisingly, only one 
individual was aware of the tornado warning when it was posted by Environment Canada at 
3:48 p.m. that afternoon.  Jerome was in his basement when his weather radio began to 
broadcast the tornado warning.  He did not believe that the warning could be correct, so he 
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went outside to visually assess the weather.  It was at that point that he saw the tornado coming 
in off of the lake, and he immediately sought shelter inside: 
"I left the radio turned on accidentally . . . when I came upstairs, the weather radio sounded and 
. . . I went over to it and pressed the button and it said tornado warning for Goderich and, uh, I 
thought it was a mistake at first, I didn’t realize anything was going on and just went outside to 
have a look. That’s what I saw [the tornado]."  (Jerome, 49-years-old) 
 
 
Most people agreed that the weather went from overcast to threatening in a matter of moments.  
In terms of protective behaviours, most of the participants who were in Goderich took shelter 
from the storm.  Commonly reported shelter locations included basements and interior 
hallways.  It is important to reiterate that most people who took shelter that afternoon were not 
aware of the tornado warning, and only a few participants suspected that the storm might be 
tornadic.  When asked why they decided to take protective action during the storm, the 
participants overwhelmingly agreed that they saw or heard something that was unusual or 
threatening: 
“When I looked out [the deck] doors, I could tell that it was beyond—the wind and the way the 
trees were moving—um, it was beyond just a ‘bad storm’” (Jaide, 55-years-old) 
 
“It was very reactive because—just sort of everything, you know?  We’ve had hail before, 
we’ve had lots of wind.  I mean I—we experienced the storm that we had 15 years, 16 years 
ago now. Um, I mean I remember that.  So, uh . . . it was a gut instinct” (Amanda, 40-49 years 
old) 
 
“We probably weren’t thinking ‘tornado’, um, my instinct was just hearing glass break with 
children, I just picked him up and ran . . . it was reactive” (Allen, 30-years-old) 
 
 
Although only one interview participant reported seeing the funnel cloud, several respondents 
did remember hearing the tornado: 
"We could hear it coming and it was loud and you can hear it. . . it got really, really, really loud 
and the wind picked up and the leaves started flying off the trees and everybody got in the 




"I don’t recall seeing the tornado, but I do recall hearing it. That freight train noise they talk 
about . . . There was no mistaking it. I’d never heard it before in my life, but I knew exactly 
what it was."  (Ruth, 40-years-old) 
 
"I thought it was the hail breaking through the windows, initially. . . [then] you hear the freight 
train and your ears pop as it goes overtop" (Allen, 30-years-old). 
 
"It’s not a freight train, it’s a jet engine. That’s-- you know, they have that old tornado sound, 
like freight train going through the room. Well I was on an airplane last week and it’s a jet 




A few of the participants who were in Goderich during the storm did not take protective action.  
Reasons for not taking protective action were polarized: either people did not feel threatened 
by the weather or the storm came on too quickly for them to take shelter.  Sarah, for example, 
was unable to get out of her car before the storm overtook her.  She was waiting in a parking 
lot for her husband (a self-identified weather enthusiast, who had previously remarked that the 
storm looked tornadic on radar) when the weather turned violent.  She remembered watching 
debris from the Volvo plant going up in the air, and she wondered whether she had time to run 
into the store for shelter.  Before she could get out of the car, golf ball sized hail began 
hammering her vehicle; the precipitation was so intense that she was unable to see the front 
door of the store just several meters away.  Knowing that it was too dangerous to get out of the 
car, Sarah huddled down until the rain and hail stopped several moments later.  In comparison, 
Morgan, a 53-year-old husband and father, did not take protective action because he did not 
feel threatened by the storm.  He had previously experienced a high wind event, locally dubbed 
the '95 cyclone, and he felt that the weather on August 21
st
 was less threatening than that 
storm: 
“It didn’t feel that threatening right there. It was a heavy hailstorm and that was about it . . . We 
didn’t take shelter even during the cyclone, we had a barbeque going and we just kept on 





After the storm had passed, the primary concern for most participants was to contact their 
families.  Many people reported experiencing cell phone connectivity and reception issues in 
the hours immediately following the tornado.  Many people experienced a significant amount 
of anxiety if they were unable to immediately reach their loved ones, and three participants 
recalled feeling extreme panic when they were unable to contact their children.  After Sarah 
recovered from her near-miss in the parking lot, she was overwhelmed with intense anxiety for 
her son: 
'We were trying to get home quickly to our son . . .  and then I started going, 'My goodness—
how’s—I hope [Jacob's] okay', and [my husband's] like, 'Don’t panic, stop panicking.' And I 
was just like— and then I started to panic more for my son, but first it was worry and then it got 
a little more panicky  'cause the closer we got to the lake, the worse the destruction was getting. 
And [my son] was working opposite the salt mine down at the harbour." (Sarah, 47-years-old) 
If they were unable to contact their loved ones by telephone, many people decided to 
physically check on their family, either on foot, by bicycle, or by car.  However, most 
participants agreed that it was difficult to get around town as most of the roads were blocked 
by fallen trees or downed telephone lines.  These accessibility issues further contributed to 
participants' anxiety and frustration. 
 
After participants' had contacted their loves ones, many people went out into the streets to talk 
to neighbours and to assess the damage.  Although it was upsetting to see the full extent of the 
devastation, most participants felt that this was a highly cathartic experience, and that talking 
to neighbours helped to alleviate the shock and grief that they all were feeling.  Aileen (53-
years-old) and her husband began walking around their neighbourhood soon after the storm.  
Although she admits that it was painful to see the damage, Aileen believes that the socializing 




"We walked around trying to take in what in fact had happened. And in a way it was an 
important way of connecting with our community and still hugging people and making sure 
people were okay . . . and at that point, people were really quite in shock.  People were just sort 




 storm system 
Three days after the tornado impacted Goderich, atmospheric conditions were primed for 
another outbreak of severe weather across southern Ontario.  Although many residents were 
without electricity and many others were occupied with recovery efforts, almost all of the 
participants agreed that they learned about the tornado watch shortly after it was posted that 
morning.  Participants were notified of the watch through a variety of mediums, including: 
word of mouth (most common), text messages, phone calls, Facebook, Twitter, and the local 
radio station.  A couple of participants said that they were first notified of the tornado watch by 
friends and family who lived in different parts of the country.   
 
Although some participants reported feeling highly anxious when they learned about the 
tornado watch, others initially dismissed it as overly cautious behaviour on the part of 
Environment Canada. As Gordon (36-years-old) explained, people in Goderich were either 
frightened or apathetic when the tornado watch was posted:  
"There were two schools [of thought] far as I saw.  There were the people who say 'Lightning 
can't strike twice', and I was in the other school that said, 'We just saw this happen, we know 
that these kinds of systems can go through here. . . why wouldn't it happen again?'."    
 Accordingly, although most people reported that their friends and neighbours were hyper-
vigilant and anxious throughout the day on August 24
th
, many participants personally 
experienced low levels of anxiety.  As Robin, a 20-year-old technician explained, the thought 
of a second tornado impacting the town seemed too unlikely to consider seriously: "It would 
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just be too wild of a circumstance to actually happen.  So that was my initial reaction, I wasn't 
really too concerned about it".  
 
In terms of protective behaviors, a few participants did take extra precautions when the tornado 
watch was posted on August 24
th
.  For example, several participants chose to spend the day 
with friends or family who had a basement.  Many parents reported that they asked their 
children to stay at home with them that day, and two parents said that they sent their children to 
stay with relatives who lived outside of the tornado watched area.  Other examples of proactive 
protective behaviors included moving valuable items and family pets down to the basement, 
and remaining updated on the latest weather information.   However, while some participants 
took extra precautions upon hearing about the tornado watch, most participants just carried on 
with their day.  Many people expressed confidence in their own ability to assess the weather 
and to take shelter if necessary.   
 
As the day progressed and the weather in the Goderich region began to deteriorate, many 
people began to feel very highly anxious and uncertain.  When the tornado watch was 
upgraded to a tornado warning, many participants reported taking some form of protective 
action.  Valerie (45-years-old) was in the midst of clearing out her office when she received 
word about the tornado warning: “So we ran into the building and said, 'They’re saying it’s a 
warning now, we need to get out, we need to take cover.' And everybody bolted.  Everybody.  




While several participants took protective action because of the tornado warning, most agreed 
that they took action when the weather began to look threatening outside.  As Abigail (28-
years-old) recalls, "I wasn’t too worried about [the tornado watch] . . . When it did get dark and 
windy, I was extremely panicked and that, uhm, I was like 'I'm going to the basement'".   
 
While many participants reported taking protective action during the storm, these protective 
actions were not necessarily appropriate or effective at reducing their vulnerability.  For 
example, a few people said that the only protective action they took was to shut windows and 
doors when the tornado warning was posted.  Several participants who were at work that 
afternoon decided to drive home to be with their families after learning about the tornado 
warning.  A few participants who were at home said that they moved closer to their basement 
door when the weather started to look threatening outside.  Finally, almost all of participants 
who took shelter agreed that they only sheltered for a few moments during the height of the 
severe weather–not for the duration of the tornado warning.   
 
4.3.4 Risk communication 
In the hours following the August 21
st
 tornado, many participants experienced cell phone 
connectivity and reception issues.  This led to a great deal of anxiety and frustration for those 
individuals who relied on cellular phones to contact friends and family.  Many participants also 
reported that their cell phones quickly lost battery power and, without access to electricity, 
many participants had to carefully ration their cell phone usage.  This proved to be a challenge, 
as cell phones were the primary mode of communication for many people.  A few participants 
received hefty long distance and roaming charges as a result of their cell phone usage 
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following the tornado.  Kyle, a 53-year-old tourist who has been visiting Goderich for over 25 
years, received substantial roaming charges on his cell phone bill: 
 “[After the tornado], the phone’s ringing and ringing, and you gotta answer it ‘cause if you 
don’t answer it, [the caller] will think something’s really bad.  And yet when you do, you know, 




, most individuals reported that they were able to freely use their cell phones, 
although several people had to charge their devices at a friend or family member's house.  
Many participants used their cell phones as a means of getting information on August 24
th
.  
Specifically, people used their cell phones to communicate with friends and family, and those 
with 3G coverage used their devices to access the Internet.   
 
Although social media was not used by participants to obtain or interpret warning information 
in the hour leading up to the August 21
st
 tornado, it played a substantial role in post-disaster 
recovery.  Specifically, Facebook played a major role in coordinating volunteer groups, 
providing information and support, and organizing various disaster aid campaigns.  Within 
hours of the tornado, the first Facebook group "Goderich Ontario Tornado victims and 
support" was established.  Within twelve hours, it had over 7000 followers, and within two 
weeks there were over 5000 comments posted to the group (United Way, 2012).  In the days 
and weeks that followed, other thematic Facebook groups appeared, including "Goderich 
Tornado Clean Up Hub", a group dedicated to organizing volunteer efforts, "SAVE 
DOWNTOWN GODERICH", a group intended to unite Goderich residents, and "Goderich 




Many of the participants spoke about the role that Facebook played in their warning 
communication and post-disaster recovery: 
"Facebook, um, was huge, just because my friends would constantly update with prevalent 
information." (Adam, 24-years-old) 
"[Any information] that I needed was coming through that [Goderich Ontario Tornado victims 
and support] website. They were updating it multiple times a day at the beginning." (Ruth, 40-
years-old) 
"There was a number of Facebook groups that were established to bring people up-to-date and 
tell people’s stories, and, you know, talk about where help is needed, and things like that. So we 
did frequent those sites in the days following." (Michael, 42-years-old) 
"I got most [information] off of Facebook, actually. Half of what people were saying, um, and 
then providing links and stuff, and then I would just follow the links from Facebook." 
(Breanna, 31-years-old) 
 
However, there were also several participants who criticised the way that information was 
disseminated through social media.  Robin (20-years-old) is an avid social networker who 
accesses Facebook and Twitter many times per day.  At first, he was happy to see so much 
information being disseminated through Facebook groups.  But, as time went on, he began to 
become frustrated with what he felt was poor information management:  
"I mean, I felt like it was ridiculous, to be honest with you. I think there was a lot of different 
things that could have been done better in order to help . . . streamline the flow of information . 
. . I felt like, uh, you know, if there had been some sort of plan beforehand to utilize social 
media, that it could have done a world more good than it did."  
Similarly, Jackie (57-years-old) wished that someone from the town had been designated to 
help keep information up-to-date on the various Facebook groups: 
"All the information was hugely out of date all the time. Um, there were lots of social media—
especially Facebook—um, postings that could have happened. There were lots of questions 
and, and wrong information coming out on Facebook through those groups. And if they’d had 




Although Robin and Jackie had serious concerns with information management following the 
August 21
st
 tornado, they both agreed that social media had the potential to be a highly 
effective communications medium.   
 
Finally, many participants agreed that they heavily relied on non-electronic forms of 
communication in the hours and days following the August 21
st
 tornado.  Specifically, word of 
mouth was commonly cited as one of the most important ways that individuals obtained and 
interpreted risk and recovery information.  Other examples of non-electronic forms of 
communication include: the local newspaper, a flyer campaign that was initiated by the town, 
and community meetings.  Non-electronic forms of communication were essential in the 
immediate recovery process for two reasons:  first, many individuals were without electricity 
and therefore they could not easily access information disseminated through mass media (e.g., 
Internet, television, radio).  Second, in-person communication helped to alleviate the stress that 
many people experienced when they tried to tease out information from electronic mediums, 
such as news articles and television reports.   
 
4.3.5 Long-term recovery  
The August 21
st
 tornado has continued to have substantial emotional impacts on the interview 
participants well into the long-term recovery period.  These impacts are both positive and 
negative, and they occurred regardless of the amount of damage sustained to participants' 
personal property.  The negative impacts reported by participants were diverse.  Many people 
spoke with sadness about the damage sustained to the historic downtown, and several 
participants expressed scepticism about the ability of the town to maintain its historic charm: 
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"It's strange, dealing with the new normal now . . . Staples in the community, like physical 
institutions, uh like the church that was recently knocked down.  Not having that landmark 
there is actually demoralizing." (Adam, 24-years-old) 
 
"I just find it really angering to go around and look at these buildings that have been so severely 
damaged and just left to die a slow death when, um, uh, there could’ve been some fast action 
taken at the time to prevent them—to uh, prevent that amount of damage from happening." 
(Morgan, 53-years-old) 
 
“I hate to say it, but I think there’ll be some good blood and bad blood that will happen after 
this because, you know, everybody’s going to have their own image of what they think things 
ought to look like.” (Kyle, 53-years-old) 
 
 
Many participants were also distraught over the loss of greenery and beautiful spaces in the 
Goderich area:   
"I live in the forest. Because the only time I cried, truthfully, after the tornado—you get so... it 
does something to your soul, to be in this place when it’s so smashed.  And part of the thing 
that is missing is that—it was the trees . . . After the tornado, it just, it was wrong. Everything, 
like the landscape looked wrong, it felt wrong, everything was wrong." (Meaghan, 47-years-
old) 
 
"I think the fact that we couldn't get to the Square for a long time kind of gave me and 
everybody some time to heal and kind of get used to what has happened to our town . . . I mean, 
we knew it was bad but [when] you walked around it saw it... that was the next hurdle.  Getting 
used to looking at things that didn't look good anymore." (Jaide, 55-years-old) 
 
"It’s heartbreaking to see these old buildings go . . . It’s really sad to see that. And it’s sad to go 
to Harbour Park, which had all these beautiful magnificent trees and it’s just…it’s just bare 
field now. It’s really sad." (Amanda, 40-45 years old) 
 
 
Several participants expressed feelings of guilt or resentment towards other members of the 
community.  The guilt was commonly reported by those participants who were comparatively 
less affected by the tornado.  These individuals felt remorseful when they were able to resume 
their normal lives, while others in the community–many of whom were friends and 
neighbours–had their lives irreparably altered.  Those individuals who expressed feelings of 
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resentment commonly directed their frustrated at those people who refused to 'move on' from 
their experiences:  
"[People] said to me, 'You know I'm tired of all this hoopla about this tornado. You know, I just 
I'm tired of hearing stories about it, I'm tired of listening to people about it, I just like it to move 
on'.   And that’s people [whose] houses weren’t affected. They were inconvenienced, not 
having hydro for four or five days, but after a week they were tired of listening to other people 
talk about their stories." (William, 44-years-old) 
 
Others expressed resentment towards their public officials and towards "rubber-neckers" who came 
from outside of the community to gawk at the destruction:   
"There were some really horrible people who came into town from wherever and wandered 
around and spent hours wandering around and standing in the way of people trying to get their 
belongings out of what was left of their homes or trying to get trees moved.  And they’re just 
standing there taking pictures of people’s houses." (Valerie, 45-years-old) 
 
 
In terms of the positive impacts, participants overwhelmingly agreed that the tornado fostered a 
sense of community and belonging among Goderich residents: 
"I think there was a tremendously powerful, uh, sense of community and helping.  Incredible 
that it was. That you could not run into someone, someone even that you knew remotely, who 
wouldn’t say, “Are you guys okay?”  There was huge spirit in that regard [and] huge 
outpourings of generosity from people in the community." (Aileen, 53-years-old) 
 
"That [disaster] has changed this community forever.  Period.  For the better.  Because now we 
understand what 'community' really means." (Meaghan, 47-years-old) 
 
"There was obviously, you know, the disappointment, the devastation, but at the same there, 
there was a real sense of community.  Of people just coming together and helping each other 
out." (Adam, 24-years-old) 
 
"[Friends] wanted to come to support us . . .that was really helpful.  We have friends we 
didn’t—haven’t heard from in 20 years contact us by email, sometimes by phone.  Um, they’d 
heard about this in Goderich, “Were we affected?” That was really helpful for us."  (Jenny, 64-
years-old) 
 
Although some participants had issues with various aspects of the recovery process (e.g., 
communication from public officials; inability to access property in the downtown area; quality and 
frequency of updates from traditional media; issues related to property insurance), almost everyone 




4.3.6 Comparison of the interviews and questionnaires  
The results from the thematic analysis of the interviews were consistent with the results from 
the larger sample questionnaire.  As previously discussed, the socio-demographics of the 
interview participants were reasonably similar to those of the questionnaire respondents.  





, and during the long-term recovery period were corroborated by the 
questionnaire results.  With this in mind, the stories and perspectives that were shared in this 








A total of 304 questionnaires were received by the closing date of March 15
th
, 2012.  Of these, 
268 questionnaires had been completed and were included in the data analysis.  This sample 
size is comparable to that of several other studies conducted on public perception of and 
response to severe weather (e.g., Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Silver and Conrad, 2010; 
Zhang et al., 2007; Balluz et al., 2000; Sherman-Morris, 2005; de Man and Simpson-Housley, 
1987; Wong and Yan, 2002; Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002).  As the number of responses 
varied per question from 122 to 268 (since not all respondents answered every section of the 
questionnaire), the denominator for all of the percentages stated in this chapter was determined 
based on the number of responses to each question.  Based on this sample size, the percentages 
that are reported in this chapter can be extrapolated to the general population of Goderich at a 
95% confidence level with a margin of error between 1.2 to 5.8%.  To further ensure 
generalizability of the results, the socio-demographics of the questionnaire respondents were 
compared to Statistics Canada's 2006 Community Profile for Goderich, and were found to be 
similar (Table 5.1).   
 
5.1 General weather questions 
At the beginning of the questionnaire, respondents were asked a series of questions about how 
often they accessed specific weather sources.  In general, women tended to check the weather 




Stats. Canada  
(2006) 
Thesis Survey 
Age (median) 45.6 40-49 
Gender (% female) 53 66¹ 
Education (% with high school diploma) 27 22 
Education (% with university or college diploma) 36 36 
Income (median) $63,965 $50,000 - $74,999 
Employment status (% employed) 57 74 





accessed source, with 47% of respondents using this medium at least once per day.  The 
Environment Canada website, the Weather Network website, and the Weather Network 
television channel were all accessed by approximately 25% of respondents at least once per 
day.  Cell phone applications were the least accessed medium, with 50% of respondents rarely 
or never using this service.  Examples of other sources of weather information included 
visually assessing the weather and national news outlets.  A substantial proportion of 
respondents (30-35%) indicated that they "rarely or never" checked the weather sources 
mentioned in the questionnaire.   
 
When asked how often they check the weather, 50% of respondents indicated that they checked 
the weather regularly, while 38% of respondents indicated that they only checked the weather 
when there was a special reason for them to do so (e.g., when planning a trip).  The vast 
majority of respondents (84%) indicated that they checked the weather more often than usual if 
Table 5.1:  Demographic characteristics of the questionnaire respondents, in comparison to the 2006 Statistics 
Canada community profile for Goderich, Ontario.  Although the 2011 census has since been released, it does not 
contain the demographic information listed above.   
 
¹Although females are over represented in this study, it is common for women to respond to questionnaires more 
often than men (e.g., Sax et al., 2003; Underwood et al., 2000). 
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severe weather had been forecasted.  Sixty-seven percent of respondents also indicated that 
they tried to avoid traveling if there was a weather warning posted for their area.  In terms of 
trust, most respondents indicated that they trusted the forecasts issued by Environment Canada 
(63%), the local news (58%), and the Weather Network (51%).  
 
When asked the best way to disseminate weather warning information to individual end users, 
the majority of respondents (33%) indicated that an outdoor warning siren would be the most 
effective medium.  This finding is interesting, given that the question did not specify the type 
of weather warning to be communicated.  Other respondents indicated that an automated text 
message (19%) or telephone call (15%) would be their most preferred method.  Although 25% 
of respondents indicated that they had reliable access to an Environment Canada weather radio, 
only five respondents indicated that the weather radio would be their preferred method of 
warning communication.  Seven respondents indicated that they could not choose one "best" 
method for communicating a warning, but rather that multiple methods should be used to 




, 2011 Goderich, Ontario tornado 
Eighty-one percent of respondents (n=218) were in the Goderich region on Sunday, August 
21
st
, 2011.  Of these individuals, 55% indicated that they had not paid much attention to the 
weather in the hour leading up to the tornado.  Accordingly, although Environment Canada 
issued a tornado warning for Goderich at 3:48 pm, only 12 respondents (4.5%) received the 
warning before the storm reached the town.  In terms of the tornado's impacts, nine 
respondents indicated that someone in their household had been injured during the tornado, and 
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two respondents indicated that someone in their household had required medical attention as a 
result of their injuries.  Twenty-three percent of respondents said that their home sustained 
some degree of damage as a result of the tornado on August 21
st
, with 15 respondents 
indicating that their home had sustained serious structural damages.   
 
5.2.1 Protective action decision-making 
When asked about protective action decisions, only 35% of respondents indicated that they 
took any form of protective action during the tornado.  The majority of these individuals 
decided to take protective action as a result of hearing or seeing something unusual, such as 
hearing the wind, rain, and/or hail become very intense (n=63), seeing objects flying around 
outside (n=38), or seeing trees bending in the wind (n=48) (Figure 5.1).  Examples of other 
cues that motivated protective action included unusual animal behavior (n=5) and hearing the 
"freight train" noise often associated with tornadoes (n=7).  As one individual noted:   
I was on the phone and it went dead, then I heard a loud sound like a train coming right for us.  
My husband heard it too, and he came in from outside and yelled to get in the basement.  
(Female, aged 60 or older)  
 
Most individuals indicated that it was some combination of these audio-visual cues that led 
them to take protective action, not one factor in particular.  Only eight of these individuals had 
heard about the tornado warning issued by Environment Canada, and all of these respondents 
indicated that the tornado warning was not the only factor that influenced their protective 
action decisions.  Rather, each of these respondents indicated that their decision to take 
protective action was at least equally motivated by hearing or seeing something unusual.  This 







a weather warning seek to confirm risk for themselves before taking protective action  (e.g., 
Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002; Sherman-Morris, 2010).  Of the 136 respondents who did not 
take protective action during the storm, one-half (51%) indicated that they did not realize there 
was a tornado on the ground.  Other common reasons for not taking protective action include 
(not mutually exclusive): it happened too quickly to do anything (n=46) and the weather did 
not appear to be that severe (n=23).  Eleven respondents indicated that they were unable to take 
shelter for a variety of reasons (e.g., because they were at work or because they were in a 
vehicle), while seven respondents said that they would have taken shelter but that they had no 
where safe to go.   Only one person indicated that she chose not to take shelter because she 
wanted to see the tornado.    
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
Other 
Saw objects being thrown around outside 
Heard the tornado warning  
Saw the tornado 
Saw trees bending/breaking in the wind 
The sky got very dark 
The rain/wind/hail became very intense 
Heard/saw glass breaking 
# of Respondents Moved to Take Protective Action 
Factors That Motivated Protective Action on August 21st, 2011 
Male 
Female 
Figure 5.1:  Respondents were asked to indicate those factors (not mutually exclusive) that motivated their 
protective action decisions during the August 21
st
 tornado.    
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Many different factors have been identified in the literature as being influential in the decision-
making process during severe weather events (e.g., gender, age, education, previous disaster 
experience, awareness of tornado warnings, and risk perception).  However, none of these 
factors significantly influenced protective action decision-making during the August 21
st
 
Goderich, Ontario tornado (as determined using Chi-Square analysis).  In terms of gender, only 
33% of the males (n=18) and 36% of the females (n=54) took some form of protective action.  
Similarly, neither the age nor the education of respondents significantly influenced protective 
action decision-making during the tornado, although those with post-secondary education were 
slightly more likely to take protective action (Table 5.2).  Awareness of the tornado warning 
also did not significantly increase the likelihood of taking protective actions, as only seven of 
the 12 respondents who knew about the tornado warning took protective action.  Respondents' 
existing perceptions of tornado risk were equally unrevealing about protective decisions during 
the tornado.   
 
Percentage of each age group 
that took protective action 
Percentage of each education level 
that took protective action 
Less than 20 100¹ Elementary school 24 
20-29 22 High school diploma 25 
30-39 35 Trade of technical certificate 39 
40-49 41 College diploma/program 39 
50-59 36 University degree(s) 36 





Table 5.2:  Age and education breakdown for those individuals who indicated that they took 
protective action during the August 21
st
, 2011 tornado.   
 
¹Although 100% of 18 and 19 year-olds took protective action, there were only three individuals in 
this age group. 
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Participants were asked whether they had believed (prior to August 21
st
, 2011) that a tornado 
could affect the Goderich region.  Only 27% of those individuals who believed that a tornado 
could not affect Goderich took some form of protective action during the tornado.  However, 
only 22% (n=13) of those individuals who believed that tornadoes could affect Goderich took 
some form of protective action during the tornado.  Thus, more accurate risk perception (i.e., 
the belief that a tornado, however improbable, could potentially affect their community) was 
not correlated with an increased likelihood of taking protective actions.   
 
In summary, only 35% of respondents took any form of protective action during the August 
21
st
 tornado.  Individuals typically chose to take protective action based on audio-visual cues 
that indicated that dangerous weather may be approaching (e.g., wind/rain/hail becoming very 
intense or trees bending in the wind).  Most individuals (especially women) indicated that 
many different cues moved them to take action during the storm.  This finding is consistent 
with previous studies that found that many individuals seek to confirm risk through a variety of 
sources before taking protective action.  In terms of factors associated with shelter-seeking 
behavior, there were no demographic variables from the overall sample that were significantly 
correlated with protective-action decision making during the Goderich tornado.   
 
5.2.2 Post -tornado recovery 
In the hours following the tornado, the vast majority of respondents (89%) attempted to contact 
friends and family by telephone or by text message.  Many of these individuals (79%) reported 
that they frequently used their cellular phones to communicate with others during this time.  
Over one-half (62%) of the individuals who used their mobile phones after the tornado 
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experienced service interruptions and dropped calls.  In addition to calling friends and family, 
most respondents (88%) physically checked on their friends and neighbours to see if they were 
okay; one-third of respondents reported purposefully going around police barricades in order to 
check on loved ones or property.  Many individuals also spent time talking to people in the 
streets (84%) and walking around to assess the storm damage (87%).   
 
In the days and weeks following the tornado, one-half of respondents indicated that they felt 
starved for information.  Many respondents (47%) had a difficult time getting information 
electronically because they had no power, and approximately one-half (54%) of respondents 
relied heavily on non-electronic forms of communication (e.g., word of mouth, flyers, the local 
newspaper, and town hall meetings) to obtain post-disaster recovery information.  In terms of 
satisfaction with the information that was being received, most individuals felt that the local 
radio station (73%) and the local newspaper (61%) did a good job of providing information 
during the post-disaster recovery phase.  In terms of public satisfaction with first responders, 
the vast majority of respondents (93%) agreed that police, paramedics, and firefighters did an 
good job in the immediate aftermath of the tornado.    
 
Participants had mixed opinions about the performance of their public officials, with almost 
half of the respondents (45%) indicating that there had been insufficient communication from 
community leaders in the days following the disaster.  Similarly, 46% of respondents felt that 
post-disaster community meetings did not have enough two-way communication between 
residents and their public officials.  However, 70% of respondents felt that the post-disaster 
community meetings were useful, and that they provided residents with the opportunity to 
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meaningfully connect with their public officials.  Overall, 72% of respondents indicated that 




, 2011 storm system 
In an effort to understand how previous disaster experience can affect risk perception and 
protective-action decision making during subsequent severe weather events, respondents were 
also asked a series of questions regarding their experiences on August 24
th
, 2011.  As 
mentioned previously, Environment Canada had issued tornado watches for much of southern 
Ontario in the morning of August 24
th
.  By 6:30 p.m. that afternoon, Environment Canada had 
upgraded the tornado watch to a tornado warning for the Goderich region.  In general, 
respondents felt that there was a high degree of situational awareness among Goderich 
residents on August 24
th
, 2011.  The majority of respondents (74%) indicated that they had 
learned about the tornado watch soon after it was posted, and 81% of respondents felt that 
people were talking about the weather all day.  Most respondents (68%) indicated that they 
checked the weather more often than usual, and 74% of respondents recall community 
members being hyper-vigilant about the weather for most of the day.   
 
Although these results indicate that there was a high degree of situational awareness among 
respondents (which was motivated by their prior experience with a damaging tornado), this 
awareness did not necessarily translate into either improved risk perception or precautionary 
behavior.  One-third of the respondents felt that most people overreacted when the tornado 
watch was posted, and 25% of respondents were not concerned about the tornado watch 
because they did not believe a second tornado would hit Goderich.  In addition, 33% of  
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Response Pattern # of Respondents (%) 
Took protective action on both Aug. 21
st
 and Aug. 24
th
  40 (26%) 
Took protective action on Aug. 21
st
, but not on Aug. 24
th
  18 (12%) 
Did not take protective action on either Aug. 21
st
 or Aug. 24
th
  48 (32%) 
Did not take action on Aug. 21
st
, but took protective action on Aug. 24
th




respondents did not take any form of protective action when Environment Canada upgraded the 
tornado watch to a tornado warning at 6:30 p.m.  Of these individuals, 75% planned to take 
protective action if the weather became severe, and 62% felt confident in their own ability to 
determine whether to take protective action.  These results suggest that, despite their recent 
experience with a damaging tornado, a significant portion of respondents trusted their own risk 
judgements above the recommendations outlined in the Environment Canada tornado warning.    
 
Additional support for this finding can be found by examining the differences in protective 
action decisions made by those respondents who experienced both events (Table 5.3).  While 





, a significant proportion (32%) did not take protective action on either day.  
Perhaps more interesting are those individuals who indicated that they took protective action 
on August 21
st
 but not on August 24
th
.  However, it is important to note that 30% of the 
respondents who experienced both events made more appropriate protective action decisions 
on August 24
th
.  Thus, previous disaster experience seemed to positively influence protective-
action decisions for some individuals.  These findings suggest that the importance of previous 
Table 5.3:  Comparison of protective action decisions made on August 21
st
 and August 24
th
 for those individuals 
who experienced both events (n=191). 
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disaster experience in the decision-making process during subsequent events is highly variable 
and context-dependent. 
 
5.4 Long-term recovery period 
A section was added to the end of the questionnaire to explore how residents were recovering 
four months after the tornado.  Two broad themes strongly emerged in this section: the positive 
impact of the disaster on residents' sense of community, and the negative impact of the disaster 
on residents' place attachments.   
 
5.4.1 Positive impacts on sense of community  
Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that they felt more connected to their community as a 
result of their experiences in August, 2011.  Seventy-nine percent of respondents agreed that 
they felt the community was closer now than it had been before the tornado, and almost half of 
respondents (46%) agreed that they were now closer with their friends and neighbours.  There 
was also a healthy amount of optimism expressed by the majority of questionnaire respondents.  
For example, 73% of respondents felt that the disaster represented an opportunity for the town 
of Goderich, and 79% felt that the disaster brought the best in people.  Sixty-four percent of 
respondents also felt that they could personally help their community to recover from the 
disaster.  When asked about their satisfaction with the recovery process over the last four 
months, 65% of respondents felt that their public officials had done a good job since the 





5.4.2 Negative impacts on place attachments  
Although the majority of respondents agreed that the disaster has had a positive impact on the 
sense of community in Goderich, most participants also responded strongly to questions that 
probed negative impacts to their town.  A significant portion of participants expressed concern 
over the future development in the downtown core.  For example, 77% of respondents worry 
that Goderich has permanently lost some of its historic charm, and almost half of respondents 
(48%) worry that any new development will not be as charming or beautiful as the buildings 
that were lost.  When asked about long-term recovery, only half (48%) of respondents felt that 
Goderich could truly recover from the tornado.  Similarly, 71% of respondents were concerned 
that affected business owners will not want to rebuild after the disaster.   
 
While many respondents expressed optimism about Goderich's future, many also expressed 
conflicting emotions of disbelief, guilt, and worry.  For example, over half of respondents 
(61%) expressed worry that people outside of the community will forget about Goderich even 
though resident's still need recovery assistance.  Many respondents (69%) said that they still 
could not believe that the disaster had happened to their town, and a small percentage (18%) 
wanted people to move on and stop talking about the tornado so much.  Interestingly, almost 
half (45%) of the respondents said that they felt guilty because they were not affected by the 
storm as badly as others in their community.   
 
Participants also responded very strongly to questions about their attachments to the physical 
landmarks in Goderich.  Eighty-two percent of respondents said that they felt sad whenever 
they visited the Courthouse Square, and respondents overwhelmingly agreed (95%) that the 
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landscape of downtown Goderich feels 'barren'.  Many individuals mentioned the loss of green 
space as the reason for their feelings of sadness and detachment.  For example, 94% of 
respondents strongly agreed that the Courthouse Square does not feel same without all of the 
trees.  When asked how they respond to these feelings of loss and sadness, one-fourth of 
respondents (24%) said that they avoid going into the hardest hit areas because it still makes 
them feel uncomfortable.   
 
To summarize, participants responded strongly to questions that involved the long-term 
impacts of the tornado on both the physical and social aspects of their community.  Two broad 
themes involving individuals' sense of community and place attachments clearly emerged 
throughout this section.  Specifically, most individuals agreed that the tornado has brought 
residents closer together in the months following the disaster.  Many respondents also 
expressed a healthy amount of optimism about the future wellbeing of their town.  However, 
participants also responded very strongly to questions that probed the tornado's impacts on 
their physical community.  Many people expressed intense feelings of sadness at the loss of the 
greenery and the historic landmarks in their town.  Others expressed feelings of worry and 
uncertainty about the ability of their community to recover from the tornado.  These results 
show that respondents' place attachments have been significantly affected, both positively and 















 tornado and the subsequent severe weather system on August 24
th
 provided the 
opportunity to examine the roles of risk perception and previous disaster experience on the 
decision-making process during successive high-risk events.  This study also provides several 
other valuable insights, including the ways that individuals obtain, interpret, and disseminate 
risk and recovery information; and the impacts (both positive and negative) of a high-risk 
short-notice disaster on place attachments.   
 
6.1 Influential factors in the decision-making process 
Prior to August 21
st
, 2011 many participants believed that a tornado could never affect 
Goderich, either because it was physically impossible or because it was so statistically unlikely 
as to be effectively impossible.  Additionally, only a few participants were aware that 
Environment Canada had issued a tornado warning at 3:48 p.m.  Considering these factors, it is 
not surprising that only a small proportion of individuals suspected that the August 21
st
 storm 
might be tornadic.  However, most people who were in the immediate Goderich area took 
protective action during the storm on August 21
st
.  When asked about the factors that motivated 
them to take shelter that afternoon, participants overwhelmingly agreed that they took 
protective action in response to threatening or unusual sights and sounds.  Thus, response on 
August 21
st






, many participants reported that friends and family were hyper-vigilant about 
the weather conditions after the tornado watch had been posted that morning.  However, most 
participants felt that this hyper-vigilance was unnecessary (although understandable) as it was 
unlikely that a second tornado would impact their community.  Accordingly, almost half of the 
respondents did not take any form of protective action on August 24
th
.  This finding contradicts 
several earlier studies that found that previous disaster experience positively influenced 
protective behaviours during subsequent events (e.g., Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Mileti 
and Sorensen, 1987).  In particular, Comstock and Mallonee (2005) found that individuals who 
had previously experienced a damaging tornado were more likely to take protective action if 
they were given sufficient warning and if they had access to adequate shelter.  Residents of 
Goderich were given over six hours of notification before the tornado watch was upgraded to a 
tornado warning on August 24
th
, but less than half of participants took protective action at this 
time. 
 
Interestingly, those participants who took protective action on August 24
th
 reported two distinct 
types of protective behaviours: proactive and reactive.  Those who took proactive protective 
actions typically did so upon hearing about the tornado watch.  These actions included moving 
valuable possessions into the basement and securing loose items such as lawn furniture.  
However, most participants waited to take self-protective action until after they heard that a 
tornado warning had been issued (less common) or when the weather began to look threatening 
outside (more common).  Thus, while more people reported taking protective action on August 
24
th
, a similar proportion of respondents demonstrated self-protective behaviours during both 
storms.  When asked why they chose not to take shelter, most people agreed that they did not 
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believe that a tornado was a serious threat.  This finding is consistent with several previous 
studies that examined protective behaviours during tornado warnings (e.g., Hammer and 
Schmidlin, 2002; Sherman-Morris, 2010).   
 
Although risk perception was low prior to August 21
st
, afterwards there was very little 
observed improvement in perception of tornado risk among most respondents.  This finding 
contradicts several previous studies that found that personal experience with a damaging 
tornado is likely to increase perception of tornado risk (e.g., Mileti and Sorensen, 1987; 
Comstock and Mallonee, 2005).  Ironically, several people decided not to take protective 
action on August 24
th
 as a direct result of their experiences on August 21
st
.  Specifically, 
participants said that weather conditions on August 24
th
 did not seem as threatening as they had 
on August 21
st
.  For this reason, they perceived risk to be low (and chose not to take protective 
action) despite the tornado watch/warning issued by Environment Canada.  This appears to be 
the first study to directly link previous disaster experience with a reduction in protective 
behaviours during a successive event.   
 
However, this is not to suggest that none of the respondents reported improvements in 
protective action decision-making as a result of their experiences on August 21
st
.  On the 
contrary, approximately one-third of respondents took protective action on August 24
th
 when 
they had not done so on August 21
st
.  Although many of these actions were proactive and did 
not necessarily involve appropriate self-protective behaviours, these results do suggest that 
previous disaster experience may positively influence protective actions (or at least situational 
awareness) for some people during successive events.   
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To summarize, neither risk perception nor previous disaster experience was significantly 
correlated with protective action decisions made on either August 21
st
 or August 24
th
.  In terms 
of socio-demographics, age and having post-secondary education were slightly correlated with 
improved protective action decisions, but gender, income, employment status, and mobility 
status were not.  Additionally, individuals who were aware of the Environment Canada tornado 
warning were not significantly more likely to take self-protective action than those who were 
not aware of the tornado warning on either August 21
st
 of August 24
th
.  The only factor that 
consistently led to protective action decision-making on both days was the observation of 
unusual or threatening conditions (e.g., intense wind, rain, or hail).  These findings are 
unexpected and contradict the existing literature.   
 
A substantial proportion of the literature on tornado risk perception and response cites different 
(and often contradictory) factors as being influential in the decision-making process (Table 
6.1).  Sitkin and Pablo (1992) found that risk perception and risk propensity (i.e., the innate 
tendency of an individual to be either risk averse or risk seeking) affected decision-making 
during high-risk situations.  Much of the existing literature on hazards focuses on risk 
perception as the primary factor in the decision-making process; comparatively less emphasis 
has been placed on examining risk propensity as a motivating factor during high-risk short-
notice disasters.  Given the conflicting and often contradictory findings of tornado risk 
perception and response studies, it may be useful to examine the role of risk propensity on 





Author (Year) Factors positively associated with  
protective action decision-making 
Balluz et al. (2003)  Having at least a high school education. 
 Having a basement  
 Living in the tornado path and receiving tornado warning 
 Having heard tornado sirens 




 Age and gender (female) 
 Hearing the tornado siren 
 Talking to other individuals 
 Perception of tornado as threat 
 
Comstock and Mallonee  
(2005) 
 Previous disaster experience 
 Adequate warning lead time 
 Access to suitable shelter 
 
Hammer and Schmidlin 
(2002) 
 Television reports advised protective actions 
 Perception of tornado as a threat 




 Gender (female) 
 Trust in weather forecaster (parasocial relationship) 
 
Schmidlin et al. 
(2009) 
 Perception of tornado as threat 
 Knowledge of suitable shelter 
 Mobile home located on private lot 
 Gender (male) 
 Presence of children in household 
 Having a high school diploma 
 No reference to "God's will" in the interview 
 
de Man and Simpson-
Housley (1987) 
 Gender (female) 
 Education  
 
Murphy et al. (2005)  Previous disaster experience 





high-risk short-notice disasters, this would have substantial implications for the transferability 
of previous disaster research conducted in the United States to a Canadian context.   
Table 6.1:  Summary of factors that were found to significantly influence protective behaviours during tornado 
events in the United States.   
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6.2 The use and dissemination of risk and recovery information 
Most respondents learned about the tornado watch on August 24
th
 through mass media sources, 
such as television, the Internet, and the radio.  This finding is widely supported by previous 
research on warning communication (e.g., Schmidlin et al., 2009; Hammer and Schmidlin, 
2002; Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Sherman-Morris, 2005).  Additionally, numerous 
respondents reported that they first heard about the warning from a telephone call or a text 
message on their mobile phone.  A recent study on tornado warning dissemination and 
response on a university campus found that cell phones are increasingly important for tornado 
warning dissemination (Sherman-Morris, 2010).   
 
Existing research is divided on the role of mass media and risk perception.  While some 
research has found no apparent relationship between access to mass media and distorted risk 
perception, other research has found that an overabundance of risk information can contribute 
to a heightened perception of risk (Sjöberg, 2000).  The present study found a clear connection 
between access to mass media and distorted risk perception of some respondents.  Several 
respondents commented on the role of mass media in eliciting anxiety and hyper-vigilance on 
August 24
th
.  Specifically, respondents mentioned the emotional interviews with Goderich 
residents and the constant barrage of weather information on August 24
th
 as having contributed 
to a sense of anxiety and fear.   
 
The largest discrepancy regarding risk communication between the current study and previous 
research involves the role of tornado sirens in warning dissemination.  Numerous studies 
conducted in the United States cite tornado warning sirens as a major source of warning 
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information among respondents, and several studies cite tornado warning sirens as one of the 
primary factors that motivated protective action (e.g., Comstock and Mallonee, 2005; Hammer 
and Schmidlin, 2002; Schmidlin et al., 2009; Balluz et al., 2000).  Only a few towns in Canada 
have a tornado warning system, and Goderich is not among them; thus, tornado warning sirens 
did not play any role in the dissemination of warning information for Goderich residents.   
 
Finally, in-person communication was mentioned by many participants as having played an 
important role in the dissemination of risk and recovery information.  For example, many 
respondents first learned of the tornado watch issued on August 24
th
 by word-of-mouth.  After 
learning about the tornado watch, many people then sought additional information from 
traditional media.  Personal communication with family and friends was commonly mentioned 
as having played an important role in risk confirmation, as well as the decision to take self-
protective action.  The influential role of personal communication in confirmation seeking and 
protective action decision-making by participants is supported by previous studies on risk 
communication and tornadoes (e.g., Sherman-Morris, 2010; Hammer and Schmidlin, 2002).  
Lastly, the majority of respondents agreed that in-person communication was essential in the 
hours and days following the tornado when many people were unable to access traditional 
media due to issues of connectivity and reception with electronic devices.   
 
6.3 Influence of the Goderich tornado on place attachments 
Place is one of the most pivotal concepts in geography.  It is a meaningful yet ambiguous term 
that combines location (physical location in space), locale (objects that make up the place), and 
sense of place (feelings and impressions generated by a place) (Cresswell, 2009).  An 
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individual’s sense of place is constructed by their personality, their life histories, their values, 
and their interactions with that place (Kaltenborn, 1998).  Recent research has examined the 
influence of abrupt environmental change on place attachments.  Albrecht coined the term 
'solastalgia' (an amalgam of the words nostalgia and solace) to refer to the "loss of, or the 
inability to derive solace from, the present state of one's home environment" (Albrecht, 2006: 
35).  Albrecht has suggested numerous potential causes of solastalgia, including human-
induced causes (e.g., war, terrorism, climate change) and natural causes (e.g., natural disasters). 
 
However, despite the connection between natural disasters and place attachments, there has 
been very little empirical research published that examines the influence of disasters on sense 
of place.  Two notable exceptions include research conducted by Miller and Rivera (2007) and 
Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009), which  investigated place orientation and community 
recovery in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.  However, both of these studies (as well 
as Albrecht's work on solastalgia) focus on the negative impacts of disaster on place (e.g., 
displacement, disruption, and loss), and fail to adequately explore the positive impacts that 
may also occur as a result of disaster (e.g., sense of community, social cohesion, and collective 
efficacy). 
 
The results of this research project showed a clear connection between the Goderich tornado 
and participants' place attachments.  As anticipated, many residents expressed feelings of loss, 
sadness, worry, and grief as a result of the salient changes to their familiar places.  However, it 
was also found that many participants experienced profound positive outcomes as a result of 
their shared experiences during and after the August 21
st
 tornado.  Previous research has found 
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that survivors may experience a temporary surge in unity and optimism following a disaster 
(e.g., Ehrenreich and McQuade, 2001; Miller and Rivera, 2007; Moore et al., 2004).  This 
observed trend usually only lasts through the response and relief stages of disaster recovery 
(Moore et al., 2004).  However, Goderich residents reported strong feelings of social cohesion 
and optimism well into the reconstruction phase four months later.  This longevity may be 
explained by the small size of Goderich compared to previous studies conducted in the United 
States (e.g., Moore et al., 2004; Miller and Rivera, 2007).   
 
6.4 Reflections on research method  
The conclusions of this study are based on data collected from 35 interviews and 268 
questionnaires conducted between September 2011 and March 2012.  To improve 
generalizability of future research, several revisions to the research method could be suggested.  
The largest limitation of this research project involves the selection of interview and 
questionnaire participants.  As individuals self-selected to participate and because the 
recruitment script was predominately disseminated through the Internet, selection bias is a 
potential factor.  Although measures were taken (as outlined in Chapter 3) to minimize any 
potential selection bias in the sample, future research may benefit from a probability sampling 
framework and a larger sample size.   
 
Future researchers may also benefit from incorporating a 'quick response' methodology into 
their research framework.  Although data collection for the current study was initiated 
immediately upon receiving ethics approval from the University of Waterloo's Office of 
Research Ethics, this still left a four week gap between the tornado and the first interview.  It 
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has been well established in the literature that disaster survivors often experience "memory 
decay", and that a quick-response methodology is important to maximize respondent recall of 





 tornado and the subsequent severe weather system on August 24
th
 provided the 
opportunity to examine the roles of risk perception and previous disaster experience on the 
decision-making process during successive high-risk events.  The results show that a sizable 
portion of the sample population took protective actions on August 24
th
 in ways that were 
inconsistent with their actions on August 21
st
.  Also, a significant portion of respondents chose 
not to take any form of protective action on August 24
th
 despite having previously experienced 
the damaging tornado.  The findings of this research suggest that the significance of previous 
disaster experience in the decision-making process is highly variable and context-dependent. 
 
Current communications technologies (including social media and cell phones) played an 
important role in post-disaster recovery following the August 21
st
 tornado.  Social media was 
particularly effective in disseminating information and organizing recovery efforts.  
Respondents also used cell phones in many capacities (e.g., to access the Internet, to send and 
receive text messages, and to make telephone calls) as a means of obtaining and disseminating 
important information.  However, cell phone connectivity and reception issues contributed to 
anxiety and heightened vulnerability for some participants.  As a result, word-of-mouth 




Key insights from this research project that may be of relevance to emergency managers and 
public officials include the challenges associated with effectively communicating risk 
information to "stormy cultures" (i.e., those people who have substantial experience with 
inclement weather), as well as the nuanced impacts of the Goderich tornado on residents' sense 
of place attachments.  Many individuals trusted their own risk judgements more than the risk 
information disseminated by Environment Canada.  A possible avenue of future research 
would be to determine ways of effectively communicating warning information (including 
appropriate protective actions) to those individuals who express maladaptive self-efficacy.  
One suggestion would be to create a holistic approach for disseminating risk information that 
includes both situational awareness information (e.g., southern Ontario as Canada's "tornado 
alley") and details on effective protective actions to take during tornado warnings.  This 
information should be targeted at both those individuals who are unaware of the existing 
tornado risk, as well as those individuals who express maladaptive levels of self-efficacy.   
 
Finally, emergency managers and public officials should be aware of the nuanced impacts the 
Goderich tornado had on residents' sense of place.  While many individuals reported feeling an 
increased sense of community and social cohesion, others expressed strong feelings of loss, 
sadness, and guilt.  All of these factors can influence individual- and community-level 
resilience well into the long-term recovery period.  It is essential for emergency managers and 
decision-makers to consider these conflicting emotions when developing long-term recovery 
plans, and in preparing for any potential future disasters.    
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SECTION A:  General Weather Questions 
1. Where do you typically obtain weather information, such as forecasts and weather 
warnings?   
 
2. Can you tell me about what motivates you to check the weather forecast? 
a.  [PROBE:  How often do you check the forecast?  Does your frequency change 
if severe weather has been forecast for your area?] 
 
3. Were you aware that Environment Canada issues two different types of severe weather 
products: weather watches and weather warnings?   
a. [PROBE: If yes, where do you obtain information on weather watches and 
warnings specifically?] 
b. [PROBE: If yes, in your own words could you explain the difference between a 
weather watch and a weather warning?] 
 
4. Are you aware of Environment Canada's Weatherradio program?   
a. [PROBE: If yes, do you own a Weatherradio?] 
 
5. There are many different sources of weather information, including (but not limited to) 
television and radio forecasts, Internet websites, and cell phone apps.  There are also 
many different types of forecasts, including daily forecasts, severe weather forecasts, 
and marine forecasts.  Keeping in mind the variability of weather information available, 
can you give me a sense of what kind of weather information (and in what format) 
would best suit your needs?    
a. [PROBE: What is the best way for officials to warn you about impending 
severe weather?  (e.g., television, e-mail, SMS, social media website, radio 
broadcast, government website) 
 
SECTION B:  August 21
st
, 2011 Tornado Event 
 
The following questions pertain to the tornado touchdown in Goderich on August 21
st
, 2011 at 
4:00 pm. 
6. Can you remember when you first noticed the inclement weather?   
 
7. Can you tell me about what you were doing between 3:00 pm and 4:00 pm on Sunday 
August 21
st
 in the hour leading up to the tornado touchdown?   




8. Were you aware that Environment Canada had issued a severe thunderstorm watch for 
Huron-Perth at  2:02 pm on August 21
st
?   
a. [PROBE:  If yes, where did you hear about this watch?  What did you do upon 
hearing about the watch?] 
 
9. Were you aware that Environment Canada had issued a tornado warning for Huron-
Perth at 3:48 pm on August 21
st
? 
a. [PROBE:  If yes, where did you hear about this warning?  Did you do anything 
upon hearing about the warning?] 
 
10. Did you take protective action during the storm on August 21st (such as going to a 
basement)?   
a. [PROBE: If yes, when did you decide to take protective action?  What action 
did you take?  Can you describe what factor(s) influenced your decision?  If you 
were with others, what did they do?] 
b. [PROBE: If no, why not?  Can you describe what factor(s) influenced your 
decision? If you were with others, what did they do?] 
 
11. Can you tell me about what you did in the hours after the storm had passed?   
a. [PROBE:  Did you contact any friends or family?  Did you check on 
neighbors?  Did you leave your home to survey damage or did you stay put?] 
 
12.  In the hours and days following the disaster, how did you remain updated on the latest 
recovery efforts?   
a. [PROBE:  Did you attend community meetings at the Knights of Columbus 
Community Center?] 
 
13.  Can you give me a sense about how this storm impacted you and your household?   
a. [PROBE:  Was there any damage to your home or property caused by this 
storm?  Was anyone in your household injured?] 
 
SECTION C:  August 24
th
, 2011 Severe Storm System  
 
Three days after the August 21
st
 tornado, a second system moved through southern Ontario, 
causing a widespread tornado watch to be posted early in the afternoon, followed by a 
tornado warning for much of southern Ontario in the late afternoon.   
14. Do you remember where you were on August 24th?   
a. [PROBE:  If yes, did you know about the tornado watch and warning?  How 
did you find out about it?] 
 
15. Can you describe your experiences on that day as the storm system approached?   
a. [PROBE:  Where were you?  Who were you with?  Can you give me a sense of 





16. Did you take protective action for this storm?   
a. [PROBE:  Was this different than what you did on August 21st?  Can you 
elaborate why?] 
 
SECTION D:  Cell phone and Social Media Usage  
 
The following questions pertain to the use of cell phones and social media to obtain and 
disseminate severe weather information.   
17. Do you have a cell phone?   
a. [PROBE: If yes, what type of phone is it?] If no, skip to Question 27.   
 
18. Which of the following features do you use on your cell phone:   
a. Internet browser  
b. E-mail  
c. Weather Apps 
d. SMS  
e. Social networking website/apps (e.g., Facebook/Twitter) 
f. Other [Please explain: __________________________] 
 
19. Do you use your phone to obtain weather information? 
a. [PROBE: If yes, how so?  If yes, how often?] 
 
20. Did you use your cell phone to obtain weather information or to contact friends/family 
in the hours before the August 21
st
 tornado?   
a. [PROBE:  If yes, please explain.  Did you use your cell phone to contact 
friends/family or obtain information before the August 24
th
 storm?  Have you 
used your cell phone to contact friends/family in any other severe storms?] 
 
21. Did you use your cell phone to get information or to contact friends/family after the 
August 21
st
 tornado?   
a. [PROBE:  If yes, please explain.  Did you use your cell phone to contact 




22. Did you experience any service interruptions with your mobile device before, during, or 
immediately after the August 21
st
 tornado? 
a. [PROBE: If yes, what was the nature of the service interruption?  How did this 
service interruption affect you?] 
 
23. Are you a member of any social media website, such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+, or 
Internet messaging boards? 
a. [PROBE: If yes, how often do you access these websites?  If yes, what do you 




24. Have you used social media websites, such as Facebook or Twitter, in relation to the 
August 21
st
 tornado or the August 24
th
 tornado watches/warnings in southern Ontario?   
a. [PROBE: If yes, which website(s)?  Can you describe how you used these 
websites?] 
 
25. Were you satisfied with the way(s) that social media provided important information in 
the hour(s) before the storm? 
a. [PROBE: If yes, please explain.  If no, what could have been improved?] 
 
26.  Were you satisfied with social media's role in facilitating recovery efforts after the 
storm?] 
a. [PROBE: If yes, please explain.  If no, what could have been improved?] 
 
27. There have been some complaints on social media websites about "rubberneckers" 
coming to Goderich after the tornado.  A "rubbernecker" is defined as those individuals 
who travel to an area impacted by a storm to see the impacts.  These individuals rarely 
assist with clean-up, and often get in the way of recovery efforts.  Did you personally 
notice an influx of "rubberneckers" into Goderich after the storm?   
a. [PROBE: If yes, can you elaborate?  If yes, did they inconvenience you 
personally?] 
 
Is there anything else you would like to share with me regarding your experience on August 
21
st
, the recovery and clean-up process in the days and weeks following, or the second tornado 
warning on August 24
th
?   
 
SECTION E: DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Now I would like to ask you a few demographic questions about yourself.  The purpose of 
these questions is to place your answers in the broader social context.  Please remember that 
these questions are optional, and you may skip any question(s) that you do not wish to answer. 
 
28.  What is your age group?   
a. < 20  
b.  20 – 29  
c. 30 – 39  
d. 40 – 49  
e. 50 – 59  
f. 60 – 69  
g. 70+ 
 
29. Is your permanent address located in the Goderich region?   
a. [PROBE:  If yes, how long have you lived here?  How long have you lived in 





30. What is your highest level(s) of education completed? 
a. Elementary school  
b. High school  
c. Trade or technical certificate/program  
d. College diploma/program  
e. University degree(s)  
f. Professional designation(s) 
g. Other: ____________________________________ 
 
31. What was your employment status prior to the time at which the tornado hit? 
a. Employed [PROBE: What type of work do you do?] 
b.  Retired  
c. Student 
d.  Unemployed 
e. Other (Please specify): ___________________________ 
 







APPENDIX B:  QUESTIONNAIRE 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION A:  WEATHER PRODUCTS 
 
The purpose of the following questions is to determine how you use and understand weather products, 
such as forecasts and warnings.  
 





once a day 
Once a 
day 






Environment Canada website 
(including Exeter RADAR) 
     
Weather Network (website)      
Weather Network (TV)      
Local television station      
Local radio station      
Cell phone "app"      
Talk to people      
Other (please specify):  
 
 
     
 
 
2. If an Environment Canada weather warning was issued for your area, what would be the best 
way to make this information available to you? (select one) 
 Telephone call (either landline or cell phone) 
 Text message  
 Television broadcast 
 Radio broadcast 
 Cell phone pop-up notification 
 Posted message on a website 
 Outdoor warning siren 
 Other (please specify): __________________________________________ 
3.  I have reliable access to an Environment Canada Weather Radio. 
 Yes 
 No 
 I'm not sure 
4.  I have enough food, water, and supplies to last me 72 hours in the event of an emergency. 
 Yes 
 No 
 I'm not sure 
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I usually pay more attention to severe winter weather than 
severe summer weather.   
      
I don't check the weather regularly unless there is a special 
reason for me to do so (e.g., planning a trip) 
      
I am familiar with weather patterns in the Goderich region.       
I trust Environment Canada forecasts       
I trust Weather Network forecasts.       
I trust local news sources for weather information.         
I don't feel that the weather affects me very much.         
I think some people are too obsessed with checking the 
weather. 
      
I check the weather because I find it interesting.           
I check the weather more often if it's supposed to storm.         
I try to avoid traveling if there is a weather warning posted 
for my area. 




SECTION B:  AUGUST 21
ST
 GODERICH, ONTARIO TORNADO 
 
Please answer the questions in this section if you were in the Goderich region on August 21
st
, 2011.  If you were not in the Goderich region on 
August 21
st
, 2011, please move to SECTION E:  DAMAGES AND INJURIES. 
 
1. The following questions pertain to the tornado that touched down in Goderich on August 21st, 2011. Please select the response that best 











I didn't pay much attention to the weather in the hour leading 
up to the tornado. 
      
I never thought a tornado could affect Goderich. 
 
      
I had thought that the bluffs would cause any tornado coming 
in off the lake to skip over the town. 
      
After the storm had passed I called and/or texted family 
members to make sure that they were okay. 
      
After the storm had passed, I went out into the street to assess 
the damage 
      
After the storm had passed, I checked on friends and 
neighbors to see if they were alright. 
      
After the storm had passed, I spent time talking to people in 
the street. 
      
I frequently used my cell phone to communicate with others 
after the tornado. 
      
I experienced service interruptions with my cell phone in the 
hours after the tornado. 







2. Did you know about the tornado warning that was posted for Goderich before the tornado hit?  
(please select one) 
 Yes, I heard about the tornado warning when it was posted. 
 No, I didn't know about the tornado warning until afterward.   
 




 I'm not sure 
4. Did you take any form of protective action (such as sheltering in a basement or shutting 
windows) on August 21st? (please select one) 
 Yes    (go to SECTION C: TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION) 
























SECTION C:  TAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION 
A 'protective action' is any sort of action that you take to prevent injury to yourself or others, or to 
minimize damages. Examples of protective actions that one may take in a tornado include: going to the 
basement, shutting or opening windows, or hiding in a bathtub.  
 
1. Why did you take protective action during the storm on August 21st? (select all that apply) 
 I saw objects (e.g., lawn furniture, tree branches) being thrown around outside. 
 I heard about the tornado warning issued by Environment Canada. 
 I saw the tornado. 
 I saw trees bending in the wind. 
 The sky got very dark. 
 The rain/hail/wind became very intense. 
 I could hear or see glass breaking. 
 Other people in my household were taking shelter, so I went with them. 
 I was told to take shelter by someone else (e.g., boss, police officer, parent/guardian) 
 I don't know what exactly motivated me to take protective action from the storm. 
 Other (please specify):  __________________________________________________ 
 
 














SECTION D:  NO PROTECTIVE ACTION 
A 'protective action' is any sort of action that you take to prevent injury to yourself or others, or to 
minimize damages. Examples of protective actions that one may take in a tornado include: going to the 
basement, shutting or opening windows, or hiding in a bathtub.  
 
1. Why didn't you take any protective action during the storm on August 21st? (select all that apply) 
 The weather didn't seem that severe. 
 I didn't know that there was a tornado. 
 It happened too quickly to do anything. 
 No one else was taking protective action. 
 I had no where safe to go. 
 I was not in Goderich at the time of the tornado  
 Other (please specify):  _____________________________________________ 
 
 

















SECTION E:  DAMAGES AND INJURIES 
The purpose of these questions is to gain an understanding of how the storm impacted you and your 
household.  
 
1.  Was anyone in your household injured during the tornado? (select all that apply) 
 Yes, someone received serious injuries (requiring medical attention) 
 Yes, someone received minor injuries (not requiring medical attention) 
 No, no one was injured. 
 
2.  Did your home or property receive any damages as a result of the tornado? (select all that apply) 
 Yes, my home sustained serious structural damages. 
 Yes, my home sustained minor structural damages. 
 Yes, my property sustained damages (such as fallen trees). 
 No, my home and property were not damaged as a result of the tornado. 
 
3.  Did your home sustain any damages as a result of the heavy rain on August 24
th
?  (select all that 
apply) 
 Yes, my home sustained serious structural damages. 
 Yes, my home sustained minor structural damages. 
 Yes, my property sustained damages (such as fallen trees). 
 No, my home and property were not damaged as a result of the storm on August 24th. 
 
4.  Do you own or rent a business in the Goderich region?  
 Yes  (please go to SECTION F: DAMAGES TO BUSINESSES) 









SECTION F: DAMAGES TO BUSINESSES 
The purpose of these questions is to gain a sense of the amount of property damage sustained to 
businesses on August 21st and on August 24th.  
 
1. Did your business or business property sustain any damages as a result of the tornado on August 
21st? (select all that apply) 
 Yes, my business sustained serious structural damages. 
 Yes, my business sustained minor structural damages. 
 Yes, my business property sustained damages (such as fallen trees) 
 No, my business was not damaged as a result of the tornado. 
 
2. Did your business or business property sustain any damages as a result of the heavy rain on 
August 24th? (select all that apply) 
 Yes, my business sustained serious structural damages. 
 Yes, my business sustained minor structural damages. 
 Yes, my business property sustained damages (such as fallen trees) 
 No, my business was not damaged as a result of the storm on August 24th. 
 
 





















Three days after the August 21st tornado, a second system moved through southern Ontario, causing a widespread tornado watch to be posted 
early in the afternoon, followed by a tornado warning for much of southern Ontario in the late afternoon.  
 
1. The following questions pertain to the severe storm that affected Goderich on August 24th, 2011. Please select the response that best 











I learned about the tornado watch very soon after it was 
posted. 
      
People were talking about the weather all day.       
I checked the weather more often than usual that day. 
 
      
I remember people being hyper-vigilant about the weather 
most of the day. 
      
I think that many people overreacted when the tornado watch 
was posted. 
      
I wasn't worried about the tornado watch because I thought it 
was unlikely that a second tornado would hit Goderich. 
      
I took protective action after Environment Canada upgraded 
the tornado watch to a tornado warning 
      
I planned to take protective action if the weather started 
looking bad outside. 
      
I felt confident in my ability to determine for myself whether 
I needed to take protective action. 










SECTION H: IMMEDIATE RECOVERY PERIOD 
 
1. The following questions pertain to the short-term recovery period following the tornado that touched down in Goderich on August 21st, 











I felt starved for information in the days and weeks following 
the tornado. 
      
I had no idea that a tornado hit Goderich until someone told 
me. 
      
I got most of my information from word-of-mouth sources in 
the days and weeks following the tornado. 
      
Local radio stations did a good job of providing coverage of 
the post-disaster recovery. 
      
Local newspapers did a good job of providing information 
during the post-disaster recovery phase. 
      
Gossip was a serious problem in the days following the 
tornado. 
      
I felt that there was insufficient communication from public 
officials. 
      
I was angry or frustrated with the "rubberneckers" coming 
into the community after the storm. 
      
I had a difficult time getting information electronically (e.g., 
Internet, television, cell phone) because I had no power. 
      
I heavily relied on non-electronic forms of communication 
(e.g., word of mouth, flyers, newspaper, town meetings) to 
get information immediately following the disaster. 
      
Overall I felt that first responders (police, paramedics, fire 
fighters) did a good job in the immediate aftermath of the 
tornado. 
      
Overall I felt that public officials did a good job in immediate 
aftermath of the tornado. 
      
 
PLEASE GO TO:   SECTION I: COMMUNITY MEETINGS 
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SECTION I:  COMMUNITY MEETINGS  
 
The following questions pertain to your level of satisfaction with any community meetings that you had attended in the days and weeks following 












I thought that the community meetings were informative.       
I thought that the community meetings gave people the 
opportunity to meaningfully connect with their public 
officials. 
      
I felt that the community meetings did not have enough two-
way communication. 
      
I thought that community meetings were a waste of time. 
 
      
I was satisfied with the information I received at community 
meetings. 
      
I felt that the services and products offered at community 
meetings (e.g., hot food, free toiletries) were important. 













SECTION J:  LONG-TERM RECOVERY PERIOD 
 
The following questions pertain to the progress of disaster recovery in the last four months.  Please select the response that best describes your 












I feel that the community is closer now than before the 
disaster. 
      
I worry that Goderich has permanently lost some of its 
historic charm.   
      
It makes me sad to visit the Square         
The landscape of downtown Goderich feels barren.       
I sometimes feel guilty because I wasn't affected by the storm 
as badly as others in the community.   
      
I believe that the disaster represents an opportunity for 
Goderich. 
      
I worry that any new development will not be as charming or 
beautiful as the buildings that we lost.   
      
The Square just doesn't feel the same without all of the trees.         
I avoid going into the hardest hit areas because it made me 
feel uncomfortable.   

















I don't feel as connected with my community as I did before 
the disaster.   
      
I feel that the disaster has brought out the best in people.         
I don't know if Goderich can ever truly recover from the 
tornado.  
      
I am closer with my friends and neighbors because of the 
tornado.   
      
I worry that affected business owners won't want to rebuild 
after the disaster.   
      
I feel like there is nothing I can do to help my community to 
recover from this disaster. 
      
I worry that people outside of the community will forget 
about yes, even though we still need recovery assistance. 
      
I still can't believe that this disaster happened to our town.         
I wish people would stop talking about the tornado so much.       
Overall, I felt that public officials did a good job in the four 
months since the disaster.   
      
 
 
1.  Did you connect with your community using social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) in the days and weeks following the disaster? 
 Yes 
 No 
 I'm not sure 
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SECTION K:  DEMOGRAPHICS    
 
The purpose of these questions is to place your answers to this questionnaire within the broader social 
context.  Please remember that these questions are optional, and you may skip any that you do not wish 
to answer.   
 
1.  What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 Other (please specify): _______________________________ 
 
2.  What is your age group? 





 60 or older 
 
3.  What is your highest level(s) of education completed?  (select all that apply) 
 Elementary school 
 High school 
 Trade or technical certificate program 
 College diploma/program 
 University degree(s) 
 Professional designation(s) 
 
4.  How much total combined income (before taxes) did all members of your household (aged 18+) 
earn in 2011? 
 Less than $20,000 
 $20,000 to $34,999 
 $35,000 to $49,999 
 $50,000 to $74,999 
 $75,000 to $99,999 
 $100,000 to $149,999 
 $150,000 or more 
 
5.  Which of the following categories best describes your employment status prior to the time the 
tornado hit?   
 Employed 
 Not employed 
 Student 
 Retired 
 Disabled, or not able to work 
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6.  Which of the following best describes your living arrangement?  (please select one) 
 Goderich has been my primary residence for less than 5 years 
 Goderich has been my primary residence for more than 5 years 
 I have vacationed or spent summers in Goderich for less than 5 years 
 I have vacationed or spent summers in Goderich for more than 5 years 
 I do not live in Goderich 
 Other (please specify):  ____________________________________________________ 
 
7.  Where did you learn about this research project? (select all that apply) 
 Student researcher 
 Facebook posting 
 Other Internet posting 
 Goderich Signal Star article 
 Other newspaper article 
 104.9 The Beach 
 Word of mouth 
 Other (please specify): _____________________________________________ 
 
8.  Were you previously interviewed as a part of this project? 
 Yes 
 No 
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